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YOU CAN'T ASK (OR SAY) THAT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND CIVIL RIGHTS RESTRICTIONS ON DECISIONMAKER
SPEECH
Helen Norton*
Federal, state, and local civil rights laws regulate private decisionmaking
about whom an employer may hire or fire, to whom a landlord may rent an
apartment, or to whom a creditor may extend credit. In prohibiting discriminatory
conduct, however, these laws also limit the speech of those making these decisions.
In this Article, Professor Norton explores how we might think about these civil
rights laws in the context of the First Amendment, and their place within the
Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. She concludes that the speech
restricted by these laws may be characterized as falling outside the protection of the
First Amendment, and that such laws, when crafted properly, may accommodate
both free speech and antidiscrimination values.
Federal, state, and local civil rights laws focus primarily on prohibiting
discriminatory conduct '- that is, discriminatory decisions or other actions by
employers, landlords, lenders, and others with the power to control access to
important opportunities. Regulated actions include decisions about hiring,
promoting, compensating, or firing employees, as well as determinations about to
whom to sell or rent a home or apartment, or whether to extend credit.
Many of these antidiscrimination statutes, however, also limit decisionmaker'
speech in one or both of two ways: (1) by prohibiting queries soliciting information
about applicants' disability status, sexual orientation, marital status, or other
protected characteristics; and (2) by proscribing discriminatory advertisements or
other expressions of discriminatory preference for applicants based on race, sex, age,
sexual orientation, or other protected characteristics.
Depending on the jurisdiction, forbidden communications might include the
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' I use "decisionmakers" as shorthand for employers, landlords, lenders, and others with
the authority to decide among applicants for employment, housing, credit, and other
opportunities.
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following questions and statements:
" "Do you have AIDS? ''2
* "I believe that cohabiting outside of marriage is immoral and I prefer not to
rent to unmarried couples."3
" "What current or past medical conditions might limit your ability to do a
job? 4
* "I believe that homosexuality is sinful and I will not hire gay men or
lesbians."'
" "Are you single or married?"6
" "Do you take any prescription drugs and, if so, what are they?, 7
In enacting these restrictions on decisionmaker speech, legislatures seek to
facilitate antidiscrimination enforcement, giving life to the promise of equal
opportunity for all. At the same time, these laws ban certain questions and
statements based on their content, thus limiting some exchange of factual
information and sincerely held religious and political opinions.
Except for a few cases involving discriminatory advertisements,8 these
provisions' free speech implications have received relatively little attention to date.9
2 See Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 866 F. Supp. 190, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing
Americans with Disabilities Act prohibitions on disability-related inquiries).
' See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 710-11 (9th Cir.
1999) (discussing Alaska's prohibitions on landlord statements of discriminatory preference
based on marital status), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143
(2001).
4 See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (D.N.M. 1998)
(discussing ADA prohibitions on disability-related inquiries).
' See Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (W.D. Ky. 2001)
(discussing a Louisville ordinance prohibiting employer statements of discriminatory
preference on basis of sexual orientation), vacated, 53 Fed. App. 740 (6th Cir. 2002).
6 See Regulation B (Equal Credit Opportunity), 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1) (2002)
(prohibiting inquiries into loan applicants' marital status).
' See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th
Cir. 1997) (discussing ADA prohibition on disability-related inquiries).
E.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973) (addressing complaint that newspaper advertising system discriminated on the basis
of gender).
' See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and Section 3604c: A
New Look at the Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187,
191 (2001) (noting that the Fair Housing Act's "ban on discriminatory statements has not
been the subject of much litigation or debate"); Tung Yin, How the Americans with
Disabilities Act's Prohibition on Pre-Employment-Offer Disability-Related Questions
Violates the First Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107, 108 (2001) ("Curiously, while scholars
have endlessly debated whether Title VII's prohibition on sexually harassing speech violates
the First Amendment, remarkably little has been said about the ADA's prohibition on the
asking of disability-related questions.").
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Recent litigation and. commentary, however, indicate some new interest in this
issue.'0
This Article explores how we might think about these laws for First Amendment
purposes. Part I outlines the range of civil rights restrictions on decisionmaker
speech, while Part II identifies the antidiscrimination and privacy concerns that drive
their enactment. Part III explores in some detail whether - and, if so, how - these
civil rights laws fit within the Court's current commercial speech jurisprudence,
focusing on that doctrine's mandate that commercial speech is constitutionally
valuable only when it accurately informs its recipients' choices among lawful
activities. I conclude that the restricted speech is most appropriately characterized
as unprotected commercial expression because it skews, rather than educates, such
choices by facilitating illegal discrimination and deterring applicants from pursuing
important opportunities.
Because commercial speech doctrine is currently the subject of controversy and
thus may be subject to change, Part IV goes on to assess other potential First
Amendment approaches to this problem. In this exercise, I pose a series of queries
assessing the fit of decisionmaker speech at various points along the continuum of
First Amendment protections: Is decisionmaker speech unprotected because it is
more like discriminatory conduct than expression? If it is speech, is its value
nevertheless sufficiently low to warrant something less than full protection? If it is
fully protected expression, does the government's regulation of it nonetheless
survive strict scrutiny?
These questions illustrate various approaches to describing the relationship
between speech and harms that the government has an interest in addressing. The
answers, both descriptive and normative, are far from clear (and indeed, the
discussion illustrates the uncertainty and complexity of First Amendment doctrine).
Nonetheless, the Article concludes that civil rights restrictions on decisionmaker
speech, when properly crafted, appropriately accommodate both free speech and
antidiscrimination values because they address those limited contexts in which
expression is so closely tied to discriminatory conduct to justify its regulation.
'0 See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692,702-03 (9th Cir.
1999) (evaluating landlords' challenge to Alaska's housing law prohibiting certain inquiries
into and statements about prospective tenants' marital status as a violation, inter alia, of free
speech rights), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001);
Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (assessing employer
challenge to Louisville's ordinance prohibiting inquiries into and statements about job
applicants' sexual orientation as a violation, inter alia, of free speech rights), vacated, 53
Fed. App. 740 (6th Cir. 2002); Yin, supra note 9, at 109 (concluding that "there is a real
likelihood" that the ADA prohibition on disability-related inquiries violates the First
Amendment).
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1. CIVIL RIGHTS RESTRICTIONS ON DECISIONMAKER SPEECH
Antidiscrimination laws frequently bar employers, landlords, lenders, and other
decisionmakers from making certain inquiries and statements while interviewing
applicants or otherwise communicating about available opportunities. This Article
focuses on fairly commonplace civil rights provisions that take one or both of two
forms: bans of queries about applicants' protected class status; and prohibitions on
discriminatory statements, advertisements, or other expressions of discriminatory
preference for applicants of a certain race, sex, sexual orientation, etc."
A. Prohibiting Certain Decisionmaker Inquiries
Many federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws limit decisionmaker
questions that would elicit information about an applicant's disability, sexual
orientation, age, or other protected class characteristics. 2 For example, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) includes a series of prohibitions on
disability-related inquiries at various stages in the employment process.,3 First,
" While these restrictions most often regulate interviews of, and discussions with,
applicants about available opportunities, they sometimes also govern ongoing relationships,
such as the ADA's additional limits on employers' disability-related inquiries of incumbent
employees. 42 U.S.C..§ 12112(d)(4)(A) (2000); see also CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12940(d)
(West Supp. 2003) (protecting both applicants and current employees from certain employer
inquiries).
12 The scope ofajurisdiction's antidiscrimination laws determines the subject matter of
prohibited inquiries and statements. This scope varies considerably from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Federal law, for example, does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, but some states and localities do. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(d) (West
Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(3) (West Supp. 2003).
'3 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000). A disability-related inquiry "is a question (or series of
questions) that is likely to elicit information about a disability." Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n (EEOC), Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and
Medical Examinations of Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (July
27, 2000), at *3, 2000 WL 334077181. According to the EEOC, the agency charged with
enforcing ADA prohibitions, disability-related inquiries may include: "asking an employee
whether s/he has (or ever had) a disability or how s/he became disabled or inquiring about
the nature or severity of an employee's disability"; "asking about an employee's genetic
information"; "asking about an employee's prior workers' compensation history"; and
"asking an employee whether s/he currently is taking any prescription drugs or medications,
whether s/he has taken any such drugs or medications in the past, or monitoring an
employee's taking of such drugs or medications." Id The EEOC identifies permissible
questions to include "asking generally about an employee's well-being (e.g., How are
you?)"; "asking an employee who looks tired or ill if s/he is feeling okay"; "asking an
employee who is sneezing or coughing whether s/he has a cold or allergies"; "asking how
an employee is doing following the death of a loved one or the end of a
marriage/relationship"; and "asking a pregnant employee how she is feeling or when her
[Vol. 11:727
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before an offer of employment, the ADA forbids any inquiry "as to whether such
applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such
disability."' 4 Next, after an applicant receives a conditional job offer but before she
begins work, she may be posed disability-related inquiries regardless of their job-
relatedness, so long as the employer makes the same inquiries of all new employees
in the same job category. 5 Finally, after an employee has started work, an employer
may pose only those disability-related inquiries that are "job-related and consistent
with business necessity."''
6
A wide range of questions are similarly forbidden under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act's regulations implementing the Act's prohibitions on lending
discrimination:' 7 "A creditor shall not inquire about the race, color, religion, or
national origin of an applicant or any other person in connection with a credit
transaction."' 8 Title VII's prohibitions on sex discrimination in employment have
also been interpreted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bar
certain employer inquiries: "Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with
prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation,
specification, or discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification."' 9 "You're not pregnant, are you?" - when asked
by an employer of ajob applicant- exemplifies a question likely prohibited under
this regulation.2"
baby is due." Id. at *3-*4.
14 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2000). But "[a] covered entity may make preemployment
inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions." Id. As the
regulations explain further, "[a] covered entity may make pre-employment inquiries into the
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions, and/or may ask an applicant to
describe or to demonstrate how, with or without reasonable accommodation, the applicant
will be able to perform job-related functions." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2002).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(b) (2002). An individual's
conditional offer may then be rescinded only when the exclusion isjob-related and consistent
with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.10,
1630.14(b)(3) (2002).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2000). Title IX's regulations include similarprohibitions.
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.21 (c)(4) (2002) (stating that educational institutions that receive federal
financial assistance "shall not make pre-admission inquiries as to the marital status of an
applicant for admission"); 34 C.F.R. § 106.60(a) (2002) (stating that covered institutions
"shall not make pre-employment inquiries as to marital status").
"7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2000).
18 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (2002); see also 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1) (2002) (prohibiting
inquiries into the marital status of applicants for certain types of credit); 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.5(d)(3) (2002) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants' sex); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(4)
(2002) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants' "birth control practices, intentions concerning
the bearing or rearing of children, or capability to bear children").
'9 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2002).
20 See King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984)
2003]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Many state and local antidiscrimination laws include similar provisions. For
example, California's Fair Employment Practices Act, which prohibits job
discrimination on a wide range of bases, includes a ban on certain employer
questions about applicants' and incumbent employees' sexual orientation, marital
status, and other protected characteristics. 2 In Alaska, landlords and real estate
agents may not "make a written or oral inquiry or record of the sex, marital status,
changes in marital status, race, religion, physical or mental disability, color, or
national origin of a person seeking to buy, lease, or rent real property."22 Colorado,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nebraska are among those states with parallel
restrictions.23
B. Prohibiting Certain Decisionmaker Statements, Advertisements, and Other
Expressions of Discriminatory Preference
Many civil rights laws also bar decisionmakers from making discriminatory
statements or expressing discriminatory preferences in advertisements or other
communications about available opportunities. For example, the Fair Housing Act
makes unlawful "any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin ....",
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 and the Age Discrimination in
("[Q]uestions about pregnancy and childbearing would be unlawful per se [under Title VII]
in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification.").
21 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12940(d) (West Supp. 2003).
22 .ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(3) (Michie 2002).
23 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (1)(a) (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254(F)(3)
(West 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
15 1 B, § 4(3) (West Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-318(5) (1997).
24 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000). In a separate provision, the Fair Housing Act outlaws
efforts "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or
enjoyment of' his or her fair housing rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000). This provision's
occasional use to challenge private homeowners' litigation to enforce zoning laws or private
restrictive covenants against group homes raises right-to-petition issues that are beyond the
scope of this Article. For further discussion, see, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 940 F. Supp.
972 (N.D. Tex. 1996); David K. Godschalk, Protected Petitioning or Unlawful Retaliation?
The Limits of First Amendment Immunityfor Lawsuits under the Fair Housing Act, 27 PEPP.
L. REV. 477 (2000); Michael P. Seng, Hate Speech and Enforcement of the Fair Housing
Laws, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409 (1996).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2000) (making it unlawful "to print or publish or cause to be
printed or published any notice or advertisement... indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Title
IX's regulations include similar prohibitions. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.59 (2002) (stating that
educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance "shall not in any advertising
related to employment indicate preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based
[Vol. 11:727
You CAN'T ASK (OR SAY) THAT
Employment Act26 ban job advertisements and other employer statements that
indicate a preference against candidates based on protected class membership. The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act's regulations forbid creditors from making similar
statements with respect to loan applicants.27
A number of states and localities have followed suit. For example, the City of
New York bars real estate brokers and dealers from "refer[ring] to race, color,
religion, or ethnic background in any advertisement offering or seeking real property
for purchase, sale, or rental."28 Louisville, Kentucky prohibits employers from,
among other things, publishing any employment "notice or advertisement"
indicating "a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination" for applicants
or employees based on gender identity or sexual orientation.29 Alaska, Idaho,
Maryland, Michigan, Virginia, and the District of Columbia are among the
jurisdictions with similar provisions. a
on sex unless sex is abona-fide occupational qualification forthe particularjob in question").
So do the regulations implementing Executive Order No. 11,246, which prohibits job
discrimination by federal contractors. See 41 C.F.R. 60-20.2(b) (2002) (stating that federal
contractors' job advertisements "must not express a sex preference unless sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification for the job").
26 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2000):
It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency
to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or
advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or membership or
any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or
relating to any classification or referral for employment by such an employment
agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination,
based on age.
27 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2002) ("A creditor shall not make any oral or written statement,
in advertising or otherwise, to applicants or prospective applicants that would discourage on
a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making or pursuing an application.").
28 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-203(2)(b) (West, WESTLAW through 2002
ordinances).
29 LOUISVILLE, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 98.06(E) (2002).
30 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(7) (Michie 2002) (prohibiting any notices, statements, or
advertisements indicating a preference for housing applicants based on a range of protected
characteristics); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.21 (2001) (prohibiting any notices, statements,
or advertisements indicating a preference for housing applicants based on a range of
protected characteristics); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909(4) (Michie 2001) (forbidding any notices
or advertisements indicating a preference for job applicants based on handicap); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 22(a)(3) (Supp. 2002) (prohibiting notices, advertisements, or statements
indicating a preference for housing applicants based on a range of characteristics); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2402(d) (West 2001) (prohibiting educational institutions from
"print[ing] or publish[ing] or caus[ing] to be printed or published a catalog, notice, or
advertisement indicating a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on
religion, race, color, national origin, or sex of an applicant for admission"); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-96.3(A)(3) (Michie 1996) (prohibiting notices, statements, or advertisements indicating
20031
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1I. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN RESTRICTING DECISIONMAKER SPEECH
At least three concerns drive the enactment of these laws.3 First, information
elicited by certain questions may facilitate discriminatory decisionmaking. Second,
these decisionmaker questions and statements may deter individual applicants from
continuing to pursue important opportunities. Third, some decisionmaker queries
threaten to invade individual privacy.
A. Prohibiting Speech That Facilitates Discriminatory Decisionmaking
When limiting inquiries into individuals' protected characteristics, legislatures
and enforcement agencies have concluded that this information might otherwise fuel
discriminatory - and thus illegal - decisions about job, housing, or credit
opportunities. For example, Congress observed the following in explaining the
ADA's prohibitions on employers' disability-related queries:
Historically, employment application forms and employment interviews
a preference for housing applicants based on a range of characteristics).
3" Robert Schwemm identifies "preventing psychic pain" as an additional purpose of
prohibitions on discriminatory statements. Schwemm, supra note 9, at 251-52. 1 agree that
such speech often causes real pain to its listeners. That certain speech may be distressing or
offensive to its listeners, however, is generally an insufficient justification for regulating
expression under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(holding that the First Amendment does not permit a state to prohibit flag-burning even
though it is offensive to many); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)
(noting that offensiveness is "classically not [a justification] validating the suppression of
expression protected by the First Amendment"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(holding that profanity is protected under the First Amendment despite its offensiveness to
many); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 n.2 (questioning "whether Congress
intended [Fair Housing Act section 3604c] to confer a legal right on all individuals to be free
from indignation and distress"). This Article does not explore alleviating this pain as a
primary purpose underlying these restrictions.
Charles Lawrence, however, offers a particularly powerful example ofthis concern when
recalling a Southern restaurant in the 1960s that continued to maintain entrances marked
"white" and "colored" even after Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made separate
entrances to such public accommodations illegal. When challenged, the owner "responded,
'People can come in this place through any door they want to.' What this story makes
apparent is that the signs themselves constitute an injury that violates the anti-discrimination
principle even when the conduct of denial of access is not present." Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,442
n.50. To the extent that such signs deter African-Americans from patronizing the restaurant,
their prohibition serves the purposes discussed infra at notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
But Lawrence suggests that the signs trigger an additional harm regardless of their deterrent
effect: sending a painful and damaging message of racial exclusion to its readers.
[Vol. 1 1:727
You CAN'T ASK (OR SAY) THAT
requested information concerning an applicant's physical or mental
condition. This information was often used to exclude applicants with
disabilities - particularly those with so-called hidden disabilities, such
as epilepsy, diabetes, emotional illness, heart disease, and cancer -
before their ability to perform the job was ever evaluated.32
Congress thus intended that the ADA's framework for barring disability-related
inquiries help "assure that misconceptions do not bias the employment selection
process."33
Courts, too, have noted the connection between the information elicited by an
employer's disability-related queries and its discriminatory actions. As one district
court observed: "[l]t is reasonable to infer from the testimony presented at trial that
the asking of the question ["What current or past medical conditions might limit
your ability to do ajob?"] set off a chain of events that ultimately led to Wal-Mart's
discriminatory conduct of refusing to hire [the plaintiffl." 34 In another case, the
plaintiffs job application was rejected in violation of the ADA after a former
employer shared information about her history of back injuries.3"
By depriving decisionmakers of the ability to elicit facts that could inform
discriminatory actions, restrictions on these front-end communications help prevent
discrimination before it happens. These provisions may thus be more effective
in ensuring truly equal opportunity than after-the-fact litigation.36 Not only is
litigation too often slow and costly, it also often has limited value in uncovering and
redressing discriminatory selection practices - for example, hiring in employment
cases or deciding among competing applicants for a house or apartment.
These limitations are largely due to plaintiffs' lack of access to comparative
32 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990).
3 Id. The EEOC further explained that the ADA's prohibition on pre-employment
inquiries "helps ensure that an applicant's possible hidden disability (including a prior history
of a disability) is not considered before the employer evaluates an applicant's non-medical
qualifications." EEOC, ADA Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related
Questions and Medical Examinations (Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter EEOC, Preemployment
Guidance], at *1, 1995 WL 1789073.
" EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., II F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1328 (D.N.M. 1998), afftd, 202
F.3d 281 (10th Cir. 1999).
"s Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F. 3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 1999).
36 ADA plaintiffs are particularly unlikely to achieve success through after-the-fact
litigation. For example, the American Bar Association's annual survey of ADA employment
cases found that in 2001, employers prevailed in 95.7 percent of the federal court cases that
reached the merits of claims by workers or job applicants. Amy L. Albright, 2001
Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I - Survey Update, 26 Mental & Physical
Disability L. Rep. 394, 394 (2002); see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (200 1); Ruth Colker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999).
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evidence and other key information necessary when challenging selection practices.
Applicants who are denied a new job or an apartment rarely receive a reason for
their rejection and are unlikely ever to learn the successful candidate's identity.
Thus they are in no position to acquire comparative information that may indicate
discrimination. As the EEOC observed, "If an applicant [after having been asked
disability-related inquiries prior to the ADA's enactme.nt] was then rejected, s/he did
not necessarily know whether s/he was rejected because of disability, or because of
insufficient skills or experience or a bad report from a reference."" In contrast, an
incumbent employee who is discharged or denied a promotion is more often in a
position to identify who received disparately favorable treatment.
Indeed, a great deal of discrimination evades redress due to the challenges faced
by plaintiffs alleging discriminatory selection practices. As Michael Selmi
concludes, "Most housing discrimination results from individual cases of disparate
treatment in which it is often difficult for the individual to fully assess whether the
treatment was discriminatory because that person lacks the necessary comparative
information" and, for the same reasons, "the vast majority of [employment
discrimination] claims involve allegations relating to terminations rather than claims
invoking discrimination in hiring."38 He goes on to note that this phenomenon
"illustrates the ironies of a complaint-based [approach to civil rights enforcement],
namely, that many, perhaps even a majority, of discrimination claims are missed
because the discrimination occurs in the contract formation when claims are
significantly less likely to be filed."39
By depriving decisionmakers of the ability to elicit information that could
inform discriminatory actions, restrictions on decisionmaker speech help stop
discrimination before it occurs. In this manner, these laws address the practical
difficulties in proving discrimination at the selection stage, thus offering a key tool
in the struggle for equal opportunity.4"
3 EEOC, Preemployment Guidance, supra note 33, at *2.
38 Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1409-10 (1998).
. 39 Id; see also ]an Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1487, 1492
(1996) ("In the absence of an obvious motive or a relevant comparison group, potential
plaintiffs have a difficult time recognizing that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred, let
alone convincing a court of that fact.").
40 Note that some statutory schemes make a different policy choice by permitting, if not
requiring, decisionmakers to collect data about applicants' race, sex, and other characteristics
to assess the diversity oftheir applicant pool and whether selection practices have an illegally
disparate impact. Rather than allowing decisionmakers to note individual applicants'
characteristics in a way that might inform discriminatory choices, however, these provisions
are designed to facilitate the collection of aggregate information about an entire applicant
pool to assess entities' equal opportunity efforts.
Different statutes take different approaches. While Equal Credit Opportunity Act
[Vol. 11:727
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B. Prohibiting Decisionmaker Speech That Deters Opportunity Pursuit
Closely related to the concern that certain speech will facilitate discriminatory
decisionmaking is the fear that such speech has the intent and/or the effect of
discouraging applicants who conclude that further pursuit of an opportunity will be
pointless or unwise. Because of the power imbalance between decisionmaker and
applicant, generally leaving the latter unwilling to challenge the former,
decisionmaker speech can be especially effective, intentionally or otherwise, in
deterring opportunity pursuit."
These antidiscrimination provisions thus remove barriers that might deflect
individuals from seeking important life opportunities. 2 As the Ninth Circuit
recognized in one specific - but key - context, the ADA's restriction on
(ECOA) regulations, for example, prohibit any inquiry into applicants' race, sex, etc., in
many credit transactions, they require such data collection for those loans secured by
residential real estate. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13(a) (2002) (requiring creditors to request
information about the applicant's race, national origin, sex, marital status, and age as part of
the application). As a safeguard, however, the applicant is not required to supply the
requested information, and must be informed that the request for information is made for the
purpose of monitoring compliance with federal antidiscrimination requirements. Id.
§ 202.13(b)-(c). A number of observers have applauded this requirement, noting that
ECOA's failure to provide an exception for data collection purposes for other loans may
prevent the accumulation of information that is useful, and sometimes necessary, in
challenging discriminatory practices. E.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026,
1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting plaintiffs' great difficulty in making statistical showing of
disparate impact given ECOA limitations); Scott llgenfritz, The Failure of Private Actions
as an ECOA Enforcement Tool: A Callfor Active Governmental Enforcement and Statutory
Reform, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 447,459 (1984) (because of ECOA prohibitions, "virtually all
ECOA plaintiffs attempting to rely on statistics to prove an effects test case will be unable
to do so"). From a policy standpoint, these related antidiscrimination interests may be
accommodated by allowing decisionmakers to request such information, so long as its
provision by applicants is voluntary and the information is kept separate from that used for
decisionmaking purposes (for example, by use of a "tear-off" sheet or follow-up letter
managed by an entity's equal opportunity office that does not play a role in selection
decisions).
One might also argue that decisionmakers should track individual applicants' race,
gender, etc., so that protected class membership might be considered positively for diversity
or other purposes. For example, the EEOC has interpreted the ADA to permit employers to
invite applicants voluntarily to identify themselves as persons with disabilities ,if such
information is used to benefit applicants through required or voluntary affirmative action
programs. EEOC, Preemployment Guidance, supra note 33, at *2. The constitutional and
policy implications of such programs are beyond the scope of this Article.
4' See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
42 In the fair housing context, Robert Schwemm helpfully characterizes this statutory
purpose as avoiding "market-limiting" - i.e., removing barriers that might deter individuals
from seeking homes that are legally available to them. Schwemm, supra note 9, at 249-50.
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preemployment medical inquiries and examinations "prevents employers from using
HIV tests to deter HIV-positive applicants from applying." '43 The Sixth Circuit
acknowledged a similar purpose underlying the Fair Housing Act's (FHA)
prohibitions on discriminatory statements:
Without the regulation of advertisements, realtors could deter certain
classes of potential tenants from seeking housing at a particular location,
effectively discriminating against these classes without running afoul of
the FHA's prohibition against discriminatory housing practices.
Congress obviously recognized the key role housing advertisements play
in potential real estate transactions and concluded that the regulations of
real estate advertisements is warranted."
To this end, courts and enforcement agencies have interpreted these provisions to
prevent individuals from being discouraged from pursuing opportunities for which
they are legally entitled to compete. For example, the Second Circuit has interpreted
the Fair Housing Act to prohibit "any ad that would discourage an ordinary reader
of a particular race from answering it. '
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's regulations take a similar approach,
forbidding creditors from making oral or written statements "that would discourage
on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making or pursuing [a credit]
application." '  The EEOC has followed suit with respect to restrictions on
employers' speech, advising that both the language and context of challenged
advertisements should be examined "to determine whether persons in the protected
age group would be discouraged from applying. 47
4 Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health, 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.
1999).
" Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644,652
(6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205,215 (4th Cir. 1972):
In combating racial discrimination in housing, Congress is not limited to
prohibiting only discriminatory refusals to sell or rent .... [S]eeing large
numbers of "white only" advertisements in one part of a city may deter non-
whites from venturing to seek homes there, even if other dwellings in the same
area must be sold or rented on a nondiscriminatory basis.
4' Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1991).
46 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(b) (2002).
4 EEOC Policy Guidance N-915.043, [1989-1991 Transfer Binder] Empi. Prac. Guide
(CCH) 5212 (July 3, 1989). Note that certain decisionmaker questions can also be
considered as statements of discriminatory preference. See, e.g., Jancik v. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553,554,557 (7th Cir. 1995) (asking applicant whether he was a "white
Norwegian or black Norwegian" indicated an unlawful preference based on race); Soules v.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev,, 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering whether an
"ordinary listener" would interpret landlord's questions about applicant's child as suggestive
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The ordinary listener's perception of a deterrent message, rather than the
decisionmaker's intent when making the statement, is generally dispositive when
determining whether a statement is illegal under these provisions." The key to this
assessment is whether the ad or other statement "suggests to an ordinary reader that
a particular race is preferred or dispreferred for the [opportunity] in question,"
keeping in mind that the "ordinary reader" is "neither the most suspicious nor the
most insensitive of our citizenry." '49
C. Prohibiting Decisionmaker Inquiries That Invade Individual Privacy
Legislatures also forbid certain decisionmaker queries in order to protect
individual privacy. Congress specifically articulated this concern when discussing
the ADA's ban on employers' disability-related questions:
An inquiry or medical examination that is not job-related serves no
legitimate employer purpose, but simply serves to stigmatize the person
with a disability. . . . While the employer might argue that it does not
intend to penalize [a worker or applicant identified as having cancer], the
individual with cancer may object merely to being identified,
independent of the consequences. As was made abundantly clear before
the Committee, being identified as disabled often carries both blatant and
subtle stigma.0
In other words, disability-related inquiries are harmful not only because
of an impermissible preference based on familial status).
48 Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999 (holding that the Fair Housing Act's prohibition on
discriminatory statements may be violated if either actual intent to discriminate can be shown
or if the natural interpretation of advertisements by the "ordinary reader" is that they
"indicate a racial preference").
49 Id. at 999-1000, 1002.
SO H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. 2, at 75 (1990). John T. Nockleby explained the dangers
of such stigma in a related context:
Stigmatization results from the imposition of a label that defines the marked
person as deviant, flawed and undesirable.... The discredited characteristics
become more significant when the deviant dispositions are seen as enduring and
primary and thus part of the stigmatized person's identity. If the target is
sufficiently stigmatized, the stigmatizer becomes incapable of dealing with the
target apart from the assumption that the deviant mark is an essential part of the
target's identity.... Labeling someone as a member of a stigmatized group
ultimately serves as the basis for devaluing that person and contributes to that
person's negative perception by the entire community.
John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV.
653, 665 (1994) (citation omitted).
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decisionmakers may use the information in a discriminatory way, but also because
the information extracted may be deeply private even if never used against the
applicant. The individual is injured in part simply because someone else (moreover,
someone in a position of power) now possesses what would otherwise be closely
held personal information. These concerns are especially substantial with respect
to information about a protected class characteristic that is not readily observable
and may be considered particularly private - such as sexual orientation or
psychiatric disability.51
The Tenth Circuit echoed these privacy concerns in holding that the ADA's
prohibition on disability-related inquiries covers all job applicants regardless of their
disability status:
The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress wished to
curtail all questioning that would serve to identify and exclude persons
with disabilities from consideration for employment .... Furthermore,
Congress was also concerned with the potential stigmatizing effect of
medical inquiries. . . .If we were to require individuals to make a
showing of disability as part of a prima facie § 12112(d)(d2) case, we
would in effect be making individuals with disabilities identify
themselves as disabled to prevent potential employers from inquiring
whether they have a disability. Such a course makes little sense.52
5' Kirke Weaver described this harm when discussing the stigmatizing effects of
disclosing genetic information even when the information is not used to facilitate disability-
based discrimination:
An additional psychological burden results from the societal discrimination and
labelling [sic] of the individual with the genetic defect. The effects of such
treatment on the psychological well-being of the individual could be devastating.
Discrimination is not only a physical deprivation of equality, but also has a
psychological component as well. Individuals may feel stigmatized or depressed
because of their newly discovered status of being genetically abnormal.
Kirke D, Weaver, Genetic Screening and the Right Not to Know, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 243,
256 (1997).
2 Griffin v. Steel-tek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 594 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit has
applied this principle to incumbent employees as well, holding that the ADA protects all
workers - regardless of their disability status - from an employer's requirement that they
report prescription drug use for approval by supervisors. Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997) ("It makes little sense to
require an employee to demonstrate that he has a disability to prevent his employer from
inquiring as to whether or not he has a disability."). However, not all lower courts agree that
the ADA protects non-disabled applicants and employees from disability-related inquiries.
E.g., Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that an
employee who was not disabled within the ADA definition was not entitled to damages for
improper inquiries absent cognizable injury).
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Forbidding certain decisionmaker inquiries thus accommodates the interest of
individuals in avoiding coerced disclosure of deeply personal matters . 3
IIl. EVALUATING DECISIONMAKER. SPEECH RESTRICTIONS UNDER
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
To the extent that litigators, courts, and commentators have addressed the First
Amendment implications of decisionmaker speech restrictions at all, they have most
often invoked commercial speech as the proper approach. Their analyses, however,
have generally remained cursory. This Part explores in some detail whether - and,
if so, how - these civil rights laws fit within the Supreme Court's current
commercial speech doctrine.
The "modem" approach to commercial speech emerged in the mid-1 970s, when
the Court broke from its decades-old practice of treating such speech as completely
beyond the scope of the First Amendment.54 In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council," the Court held for the first time that
commercial speech was entitled to some constitutional protection.56 Emphasizing
that the "consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information... may be
as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate," the Court struck down Virginia's law prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising prescription drug prices.57
The Court described the contours of the constitutional protection owed
commercial speech in greater detail four years later in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission." The Court identified two categories
of commercial speech, each receiving significantly different treatment under the
First Amendment.
First, commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to an illegal activity
receives no constitutional protection and can be banned completely:
s The ADA includes separate confidentiality provisions that also address significant
privacy concerns. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3)(B), (d)(4)(C) (2000) (requiring
that employers keep confidential any medical information that they lawfully acquire - e.g.,
information obtained by working with an employee to identify a reasonable accommodation
for her disability). Although these and other confidentiality provisions are content-based
speech restrictions that deserve (but may well satisfy) First Amendment scrutiny, they are
beyond the scope of this Article.
5" E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding governmental ban
on advertising handbills and stating that "the Constitution imposes no [free speech] restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising").
5 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
56 Id; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975) (finding error in lower
court's assumption that advertising is entitled to no First Amendment protection).
17 Va. State Bd, 425 U.S. at 763.
58 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity.59
Second, restrictions on all other commercial speech (that is, accurate expression
urelated to illegal activity) receive a form of intermediate scrutiny that is skeptical
of their constitutionality, yet not as rigorous as the strict scrutiny applied to other
content-based speech restrictions:6"
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. The State must
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial
speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that
interest .... First, the restriction must directly advance the State interest
involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support.for the government's purpose. Second, if
the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive."
As the Court has repeatedly explained, this two-tiered approach makes clear that
I d. at 563-64 (citations omitted); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,768 (1993)
("[T]he State may ban commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further
justification."); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,638 (1985) ("The
States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination of commercial
speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction.")
(citation omitted); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV.
297,319 (1995) ("Furthermore, since the First Amendment's concern for commercial speech
is based on the informational aspect of advertising, false or misleading advertising and
advertising about unlawful activities are entitled to no constitutional protection.").
60 See infra notes 112, 187-214 and accompanying text; see also Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting):
[The Court] has concluded that . . . commercial speech does not warrant
application of the Court's strictest speech-protective tests ... in part because
restrictions on commercial speech do not often repress individual self-
expression; they rarely interfere with the functioning of democratic political
processes; and they often reflect a democratically determined governmental
decision to regulate a commercial venture in order to protect, for example, the
consumer, the public health, individual safety, or the environment.
61 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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the constitutional salience of commercial speech turns on its ability to facilitate its
recipients' informed decisionmaking.62 According to the Court, commercial speech
that furthers this objective is quite valuable indeed:
The listener's interest [in commercial speech] is substantial: the
consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be
far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover,
significant societal interests are served by such speech .... Commercial
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices
of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such speech
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable
decisionmaking.63
The Court's objection to government efforts "to keep people in the dark for
what the government believes to be their own good" 64 thus underlies much of its
commercial speech jurisprudence. As it observed when reviewing Virginia
consumers' demand for accurate information about prescription drug prices, "the
State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their
being kept in ignorance."65 It continued:
There is, of course, an alternative to [Virginia's] highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in
itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only
they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to
open the channels of communication rather than to close them.'
Thus, when commercial speech serves its constitutional purpose of accurately
62 See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("[Tlhe extension of First Amendment protection
to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information
such speech provides. .. ."); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. REv. 1, 14 (2000) ("The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech
should be constitutionally protected so as to safeguard the circulation of information. It has
therefore focused its analysis on the need to receive information, rather than on the rights of
speakers.").
63 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citations omitted).
" Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
65 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens' Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976).
66 Id. at 770; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) ("[S]o
long as the sale and use of tobacco is lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected
interest in communicating information about its products and adult customers have an
interest in receiving that information.").
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educating its recipients' choices among lawful activities, it is entitled to a significant
degree of First Amendment protection. In contrast, commercial speech that
undermines informed decisionmaking - because it is false, misleading, or concerns
illegal conduct - receives no First Amendment protection.67
A. Is Decisionmaker Speech "Commercial Speech "for First Amendment
Purposes?
The discussion begins, of course, with the question of whether the
decisionmaker speech limited by various civil rights laws is commercial speech at
all. Speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" '68 clearly
constitutes core commercial expression, but the Court has also emphasized
"commonsense differences" between commercial and other forms of speech.69
The Supreme Court specifically considered whether commercial speech includes
job advertisements in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
67 As discussed infra at notes 134-36 and accompanying text, the Court's dichotomy has
received its share of criticism. Despite its controversial nature, however, Central Hudson
remains good law. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-55 (responding to petitioner's argument
that the Court should abandon Central Hudson and instead apply strict scrutiny to
commercial speech regulations: "[W]e see 'no need to break new ground. Central Hudson,
as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for [our]
decision."') (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad Ass 'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184
(1999)); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366-68 (2002) (finding
Central Hudson to be the most appropriate First Amendment test for commercial speech).
68 Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm 'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
69 Id. at 771 n.24; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,637
(1985) ("[C]ommercial speech doctrine rests heavily on 'the common-sense distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction... and other varieties of speech.... "')
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss 'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-56 (1978)). This can be a tricky
distinction to make. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged "the difficulty of drawing bright
lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category." City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,419 (1993); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,438
n.32 (1978) (conceding that the line between commercial and noncommercial speech "will
not always be easy to draw"). As one observer has summarized:
Over the course of more than two dozen decisions since [Virginia State Board],
the Court has not spelled out exactly what constitutes commercial speech and
thus receives the "limited measure of protection" to which that expression is
entitled. Rather, the Court has recited various descriptions, indicia, and
disclaimers without settling upon a precise and comprehensive definition.
Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55,
56 (1999) (arguing that the lack of a comprehensive definition of commercial speech
"represents a healthy pragmatism, not jurisprudential failure"); see also Post, supra note 62,
at 8 ("[T]he impossibility of specifying the parameters that define the category of
commercial speech has haunted its jurisprudence and scholarship.").
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Relations,70 where it held that the First Amendment did not preclude enforcement
of a city antidiscrimination ordinance that prohibited a newspaper from publishing
employers' sex-segregated want ads.7" After proffering a definition of commercial
speech as that which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction,"72 the
Court concluded:
None [of the ads] expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social
policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the
other sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the
Commission's enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal
of possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples
..of commercial speech.73
In other words, as proposals of potential employment - or, alternatively, proposals
to accept applications or to open negotiations - the advertisements constituted core
commercial expression.
Only a handful of lower courts have considered First Amendment challenges to
restrictions on decisionmaker speech since the emergence of modem commercial
speech doctrine in Virginia State Board. They have generally extended Pittsburgh
Press to conclude, without much analysis, that communications involving
recruitment efforts, advertising, interviews, and other negotiations constitute
commercial speech because of their close relationship to job, housing, or other
transactions.74 More difficult questions arise, however, when a decisionmaker's
70 413 U.S. 376(1973).
7' Id. at 391.
72 Idat 385.
7 Id. at 385. In this decision predating the emergence of modem commercial speech
doctrine in Virginia State Board, the Court declined to decide whether commercial speech
concerning lawful activity should be afforded full First Amendment value. As discussed infra
notes 95-96 and accompanying text, the Court determined that this particular commercial
speech was entitled to no constitutional protection as an advertisement of illegal activity.
" E.g., Nomi v. Regents for the Univ. of Minn., 796 F. Supp. 412,417 (D. Minn. 1992)
("[Military job] recruiting proposes a commercial transaction; the purpose of recruiting is to
reach an agreement under which services will be exchanged for compensation."), vacated
as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993)); Cent. Am. Refugee Ctr.-Carecen v. City of Glen Cove,
753 F. Supp. 437,440 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting solicitation
of employment from a vehicle or by a pedestrian on a public street was a permissible
regulation of commercial speech, as "conversations relating to employment constitute
commercial speech"); see also Yin, supra note 9, at 115 ("[A] disability-related question
during an employment interview is ... part of the commercial transaction of employment,
which consists of the employee's offer of labor in exchange for the employer's offer of
compensation.... [A] disability-related question can be an attempt to gauge the quality of
labor being offered by the applicant.").
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commercial speech is combined with political or religious expression. In two
relatively recent cases, courts have reached entirely different conclusions.
On one hand, in Hyman v. City of Louisville,75 a district court emphasized the
primarily transactional nature ofjob advertisements in holding that they constituted
commercial speech, noting that the political or religious nature of some of the
speech did not strip it of its commercial character.76 In that case, the plaintiff
employer sought to distinguish Pittsburgh Press in challenging Louisville's
antidiscrimination ordinance, arguing that his proposed job advertisement involved
not only a commercial transaction, but also that it made known his religious and
moral views on sexual orientation by describing his religious beliefs regarding
homosexuality and his intent to hire only heterosexual applicants." The district
court remained unpersuaded, concluding that "commercial speech is not worthy of
broader First Amendment protection simply because it coexists with speech
addressing important public issues .... ""
Nothing requires [the doctor] to express his opinions in his
advertisements for employment. Including Dr. Hyman's political and
moral views in his "Help Wanted" advertisements does no more to turn
them into political speech than "opening sales presentations with a prayer
or a Pledge of Allegiance would convert them into religious or political
speech." Because at their essence, Dr. Hyman's advertisements are
proposals of possible employment, we hold that they constitute
commercial speech.79
For another perspective, consider Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission,8" wherein the plaintiff landlords included a free speech claim among
their various challenges to an Alaskan law prohibiting housing discrimination on the
basis of marital status. By a two to one margin, the Ninth Circuit panel ruled that
75 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540-41 (W.D. Ky. 2001), vacated, 53 Fed. App. 740 (6th Cir.
2002). Although the district court's decision was later vacated when the Sixth Circuit
determined that the plaintiff employer lacked standing, I explore the opinion in some detail
because it exposes one court's analysis of a topic that has generally escaped attention.
76 Id. at 540-41.
77 Id. at540&n.15.
78 Id. at541.
79 Id. at 541-42 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N. Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-75
(1989)).
80 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). Although the panel's decision was later vacated on ripeness
grounds by the en banc court because no enforcement action had been taken against the
plaintiffs, I discuss this opinion at some length because it illuminates one appellate panel's
thinking on this largely unexplored topic.
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the plaintiffs' claim was "colorable."'"
In so holding, the Thomas majority interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions
as suggesting a quite narrow definition of commercial speech: "The Court strongly
suggested that the only type of expression that is 'commercial' in the constitutional
sense is that which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' 8 2 The
panel found that the landlords' planned speech (e.g., inquiries into applicants'
marital status and advertisements indicating their preference for married tenants) did
much more, as it also conveyed moral and religious views. 3 The Thomas panel was
further inclined to view the speech as noncommercial because it ran counter to the
speakers' economic interests by limiting the universe of potential renters.84 The
panel concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged a colorable claim that the ordinance
unconstitutionally burdened what was primarily religious expression."
81 Id. at 711. The panel reached this conclusion as part of its determination that the
plaintiffs had established a "hybridize[d]" free exercise claim under Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to an
Oregon law criminalizing peyote as applied to individuals who used the drug as part of a
religious ceremony. The Court held that the First Amendment forbids the application of such
neutral laws of general applicability to religious exercise only when free exercise rights are
infringed upon along with another constitutional right. Id. at 880-82. The Thomas plaintiffs
sought to trigger this so-called "hybrid rights exception," arguing that Alaska's housing
statute should be subject to strict scrutiny because it burdened their free exercise as well as,
inter alia, their free speech rights. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 702-12. The free exercise issues are
beyond the scope of this Article, but they have been considered extensively by a number of
courts and commentators. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d
274,281-84 (Alaska 1994); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 749-52 (I11. App. Ct.
1997); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237-42 (Mass. 1994); McCready v.
Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729-30 (Mich. 1998), vacated in part, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich.
1999) (mem.); James C. Geoly & Kevin R. Gustafson, Religious Liberty and Fair Housing:
Must A Landlord Rent Against His Conscience?, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1996)
(discussing the availability of the free exercise exception to religious landlords charged with
violating antidiscrimination legislation); Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlords'
"Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenants'Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy,
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1995) (arguing against granting free exercise exceptions to
religious landlords charged with violating fair housing laws).
82 Thomas, 165 F.3d at 710 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens'
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
83 Id. at 710.
SId. at 710-11L.
85 Id. The dissenting judge objected to what he saw as the majority's unnecessarily
limited definition of commercial speech. Id. at 726 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Judge Hawkins
emphasized the statute's expressly limited reach to communications with respect to the sale
or rental of real property:
[A] common sense analysis strongly suggests that these anti-discrimination laws
do not proscribe speech beyond that directly associated with a commercial
transaction - the rental of real property. . . . [T]he statutory language is
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In so holding, however, the Thomas court failed to recognize that the Supreme
Court's willingness to treat "hybrid". speech as commercial for First Amendment
purposes has turned on whether the commercial and noncommercial messages are
inseparable and whether other avenues remain open for the decisionmaker's
noncommercial expression. That speech proposing a commercial transaction may
be accompanied by other speech does not necessarily rob it of its commercial
character. Instead, according to the Court, the key determination is whether the
commercial speech is "inextricably intertwined" with otherwise fully protected
speech.86
For example, the Court held that contraceptive advertisements constituted
commercial speech even though the mailings also included discussion of other
important topics like sexually transmitted diseases and family planning.87 The
Bolger Court there made clear its practical concern that "[a]dvertisers shall not be
permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from government
regulation simply by including references to public issues."" For these reasons,
coupling ads for services to evade income tax obligations with political protests
against the tax code does not blanket them in First Amendment protection.
A few years after Bolger, the Court similarly characterized a public university's
ban on Tupperware parties in campus housing as a regulation of commercial speech
eventhough the festivities included discussions of topics like financial and home
management along with product sales: "No law of man or of nature makes it
impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach home
economics without selling housewares."89
explicitly aimed at communications disclosed during the rental of real
property. . .. The laws in no way sanction or inhibit [the plaintiffs] from
speaking, writing, or publishing their views on cohabitation or their opinion of
the anti-discrimination laws.
Id. at 726.
86 See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,474 (1989) (determining
that "pure" speech and commercial speech were not "inextricably intertwined" to justify
characterizing the speech as noncommercial); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 796 (1988) ("[W]e do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when
it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.").
87 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
8 Id. at 66-67. As discussed by the Thomas majority, the Bolger Court noted that the
combination of three factors - advertising format, product reference, and commercial
motivation - provided "strong support" for characterizing the mailings as commercial
speech. Id.; Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 710-11 (9th Cir.
1999). The Bolger Court also stressed, however, that each of those criteria need not be met
for speech to be characterized as commercial. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 n. 14. In any event, the
Thomas plaintiffs' proposed speech satisfied each of those elements: it involved "for rent"
advertisements; it made reference to a specific transaction - the landlords' desire to rent the
housing units; and it was motivated by the commercial desire to generate rental revenue.
89 Fox, 492 U.S. at 474 (finding nothing "inextricable" about noncommercial aspects of
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Similarly, decisionmakers' transactional speech - for example, advertisements
or other proposals of possible housing or employment opportunities; preliminary
and/or actual negotiations such as job interviews or discussions while showing an
apartment - is fully separable from expression of their moral, political, and
religious beliefs. In short, the communications necessary to conclude an
employment, housing, or loan transaction are not inextricably intertwined with
speech describing the decisionmaker's political or religious views. As Bolger and
subsequefnt decisions emphasized: "A company has the full panoply of protections
available to its direct comments on public issues, so there is no reason for providing
similar constitutional protection when such statements are made in the context of
commercial transactions."'
these presentations).
90 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
_v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) ("There is no reason for providing
similar constitutional protection when [utilities' comments on public issues] are made only
in the context of commercial transactions."); Stern, supra note 69, at 82 (noting that when
characterizing "hybrid" speech as commercial or noncommercial for First Amendment
purposes, the Court has been especially interested in whether the "noncommercial portion
of hybrid expression could be effectively ventilated elsewhere").
In those cases, however, where commercial and noncommercial expression cannot be
parsed, commercial speech principles do not adequately safeguard the protected yet
inextricable expression. The California Supreme Court, for example, recently considered a
situation in which protected noncommercial expression appeared inseparable from
accompanying commercial speech. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003). In what I consider a troubling decision, a narrow majority
held that Nike's response to public criticism of its labor practices was not entitled to full
First Amendment protection. Id. at 247. Instead, the court held that Nike's rebuttals could
be regulated as less protected commercial expression under the state's false advertising and
unfair competition laws because they involved communications to the public - which
inevitably includes consumers - about Nike's practices in producing its commercial
offerings. Id.
This, however, appears to present a situation in which Nike's noncommercial and
commercial speech are truly inextricable. Nike cannot publicly defend its conduct from
attack without implicitly addressing some consumers and perhaps shaping their views of
Nike products. As dissenting Justice Chin pointed out, Nike defended its business
practices - which were at the center of a vigorous public debate - through traditionally
protected avenues of political expression (press releases, letters to the editor, letters to
university presidents) rather than through its commercial advertising, packaging, or labels.
Id. at 266; see also id. at 270 (Brown, J., dissenting).
I object to the majority's analysis because it fails to provide Nike with any fully
protected venue for participating in the public discourse in its own defense, for fear that its
audience would inevitably include some consumers and might influence their attitudes
toward Nike gear. The strength ofthe First Amendment's protections should not, in my view,
vary from one side of a public debate to the other. An employer, for example, who is the
subject of discrimination claims aired in the press or a corporation charged with fraud by an
elected official should be allowed to defend itself in the public realm on the same terms as
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Determining whether commercial and noncommercial expression are
inextricable demands an examination of the expression's purpose and setting.
Commercial speech doctrine is particularly helpful in explaining how to sort
protected from nonprotected speech by focusing on the context-specific dangers
posed by transactional speech. Is, for instance, an employer speaking as a
decisionmaker - that is, communicating about possible job opportunities or other
transactions to potential participants in the transaction? Or is the employer speaking
as a player in a policy debate - that is, to the public at large?
Because civil rights restrictions on decisionmaker speech reflect an
understanding of context's significance by regulating only transaction-related
communications, they thus fit comfortably within commercial speech jurisprudence.
Recall, for example, the Fair Housing Act's ban on discriminatory advertisements
and other statements "with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling,"91 and the
ECOA regulations' prohibition on certain inquiries "in connection with a credit
transaction."92 In this way, these provisions respond to the reality that transactional
speech and discriminatory conduct are closely linked, while preserving other
avenues for decisionmaker expression outside the transactional context. An
employer's newspaper advertisement that joins a public. policy debate by, for
example, endorsing David Duke for president or opposing the holiday status of
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday, is not commercial speech for First Amendment
purposes because it is not related to a specific transaction (nor, for the same reason,
would such expression be regulated by the civil rights laws at issue as a statutory
matter).
In contrast, an interviewer making such statements when communicating with
potential applicants about available opportunities presents a very different context.
Because the decisionmaker can easily conduct an employment (or housing or credit)
transaction without airing her political views, the noncommercial expression - as
in Hyman and Thomas - is by no means inextricable and thus does not strip the
speech of its essentially commercial character.93
its challenger.
91 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
92 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (2002).
Determining that the communications constitute commercial speech is by no means
the end of our inquiry. Whether, as a statutory matter, such statements violate the civil rights
laws at issue depends in large part on whether an ordinary listener would understand them
to express a discriminatory preference. See, e.g., supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
As a constitutional matter, the level of protection afforded such commercial speech varies,
depending on whether it is false, misleading, or related to illegal conduct. See, e.g., supra
notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1 1:727
YOU CAN'T ASK (OR SAY) THAT
B. Is This Decisionmaker Speech Unprotected Because It "Concerns Unlawful
Activity "?
Recall Central Hudson's declaration that for "commercial speech to come
within [First Amendment protection], it at least must concern lawful activity."94 Do
decisionmaker inquiries and statements of discriminatory preference fall into this
crevasse of unprotected commercial speech? Just how tight must the connection be
between decisionmaker speech and illegal discrimination to warrant its
characterization as "concerning" or "related to" unlawful activity?
Pittsburgh Press remains a helpful starting point. There the Supreme Court
concluded that the newspaper's sex-segregated job advertisements proposed an
illegal transaction - discriminatory hiring - and thus slipped entirely from the
reach of the First Amendment. In deferring the question whether commercial speech
generally deserved greater constitutional protection, the Court noted: "Any First
Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting
the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and
the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic
activity."95
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the sex-designated advertisements had
no empirical link to actual job discrimination, the Court held that the listings (which
consisted of columns headed "Jobs- Male Interest" and "Jobs- Female Interest")
constituted unprotected advertisements of illegal activity just like advertisements
for illegal drugs or prostitution." In other words, advertising that "I've got ajob for
a white male" is just as related to illegal activity for commercial speech purposes as
advertising that "I've got cocaine for sale."
More recently, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion when
considering Fair Housing Act claims involving real estate ads: "Since
discriminatory advertisements concern an illegal commercial transaction, the
discriminatory sale or rental of housing, they are not protected by the First
Amendment." 97 In Hyman,9" the district court agreed, holding that Louisville's ban
9' Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
9' Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1973).
96 Id. at 381 n.7.
97 Michael E. Rosman, Ambiguity andthe FirstAmendment: Some Thoughts on All- White
Advertising, 61 TENN. L. REv. 289, 337 (1993) (citing Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923
F.2d 995, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1991)). A number of commentators agree. See, e.g., LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 891 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that sex-
segregated ads "threaten[], without any further opportunity for dialogue, to cause an injury
that the government has power to prevent"); Rosman, supra, at 337 n.216 ("If blacks are
discouraged from applying for housing [by a discriminatory ad], then the subsequent sale or
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on discriminatory advertisements and other statements of discriminatory preference
simply regulated unprotected speech: "[The employer's] proposed speech concerns
an activity, discriminating against prospective employees because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity, which is made illegal by the ordinances.""
Certain decisionmaker inquiries share a similar capacity for facilitating illegal
discrimination.' 0 Questions that are intended to deter members of a protected class
are most clearly related to an illegal activity. Regardless of intent, moreover, most
civil rights statutes make unlawful practices that have a disparate impact on
members of a protected class."0' For example, disability-related queries are likely
to discourage at least some, and probably many, applicants with disabilities: recall
the Ninth Circuit's observation that inquiries into HIV-status will likely deter HIV-
positive applicants. 2
Finally, we return to the constitutional values to be promoted by commercial
speech generally when assessing whether this expression sufficiently concerns
unlawful activity to deny it First Amendment protection. Recall that commercial
speech doctrine focuses on the value of such speech in informing choices by its
recipients, rather than its speakers.'0 3 Butjob-, credit- and housing-seekers have no
interest in receiving inquiries into their protected class status, nor in reading or
rental to a white person is a discriminatory act."); Schwemm, supra note 9, at 269.
9' See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
'9 Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528,541 n.1 6 (W.D. Ky. 2001), vacated,
53 Fed. App. 740 (6th Cir. 2002).
t See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
10, E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2),(k) (2000) (prohibiting employment practices that have
an unjustified disparate impact); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the ADA prohibits disparate impact discrimination); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99
F.3d 1466, 1469-70 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ADEA prohibits disparate impact
discrimination); Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that the Fair Housing Act prohibits disparate impact discrimination); Cherry
v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that the ECOA prohibits
disparate impact discrimination). But see Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1.323
(11 th Cir. 2001) (finding disparate impact claims unavailable under ADEA).
,02 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
103 As Burt Neubome points out,
unlike political or aesthetic speakers, commercial speakers possess no
cognizable interests of their own, but rather must rely solely on the borrowed
interests of their hearers .... Thus while commercial speech is entitled to
substantial first amendment protection, such protection is available only when
an articulable hearer interest exists in receiving the message at issue.
Burt Neubome, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK.
L. REv. 437, 462 (1980).
Applying this principle to decisionmaker speech, Neuborne goes on to explain that,
"[T]he regulation at issue in Pittsburgh Press did not impinge on a legitimate interest of
speakers or hearers, since sex-typed hiring is banned by Title VII." Id. at 461.
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hearing discriminatory ads or other statements of decisionmakers' discriminatory
preferences." ° Instead, these decisionmaker communications merely facilitate their
speakers' discriminatory actions and/or deter their listeners from pursuing
opportunities for which they are legally entitled to compete. In short, this
expression thwarts, rather than furthers, the informative functions that normally
justify First Amendment protection of commercial speech.'0 '
LinmarkAssociates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,"6 the only case other than
Pittsburgh Press where the Supreme Court has considered the intersection of
commercial speech and civil rights, sheds some additional light on the requisite link
between the government's speech regulation and its interest in antidiscrimination
enforcement. Linmark involved a challenge to a local ordinance prohibiting "For
Sale" and "Sold" signs on real estate in an effort to prevent perceived "panic" selling
by white homeowners. 7 Ruling after Virginia State Board's move towards greater
protection of commercial speech - but before the emergence of the more detailed
Central Hudson test - the Court struck down the ordinance.108
Linmark is fundamentally distinguishable from the decisionmaker speech at
issue here. First, the forbidden signs concerned clearly legal transactions:
homeowners' decisions to sell their homes and leave a community. Even when
those decisions are unwise or harmful to the community, they are not illegal
(assuming that the homeowners do not racially discriminate among those seeking
to buy their property).' °9 In contrast, the decisionmaker speech at issue here is
related to an illegal transaction - discriminatory decisionmaking.
Second, the Linmark Court was troubled by what it saw as the town's
paternalistic fear that the signs' readers would respond by selling their homes and
moving away: "The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data
because it fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the
Council views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest of the
'o See infra note 183-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility that
applicants have an interest in learning of their potential employer's or landlord's biases to
inform their assessment of a job or housing opportunity.
"o' Daniel Farber argues persuasively that the critical factor in determining whether to
treat certain commercial speech as protected is whether government seeks to regulate its
"informative" or "contractual function." Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372 (1979). He considers discriminatory job
advertisements, for example, as offers or invitations of offers, where the government's
regulation "relates to the contractual function of the ads, rather than to the suppression of the
free flow of information." Id. at 400.
106 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
107 Id. at 86-88.
101 Id. at 86.
"o See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000) (prohibiting race and other forms of discrimination in
housing sales and rentals).
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township: they will choose to leave town.""'  Indeed, throughout its modem
commercial speech cases, the Court's discomfort with governmental regulation of
truthful speech for fear that folks would otherwise make poor (but not illegal)
decisions is fully consistent with a view of commercial speech as constitutionally
valuable when - but only when - it accurately informs individuals'
decisionmaking among lawful alternatives.
In contrast, paternalism does not animate civil rights limitations on
decisionmaker communications. Rather than seeking to "save" folks from their own
unwise choices among legal products, merchants, or transactions, the government
interest in regulating decisionmaker speech remains focused on enforcing
antidiscrimination laws."'
C. Are These Decisionmaker Communications Unprotected as "Misleading"?
For those who are unpersuaded that the link between decisionmaker speech and
illegal discrimination is sufficiently tight to justify stripping the expression of
constitutional protection,' 2 an alternative approach remains. Recall that the Court
... Linmark, 431 U.S. at 96.
"' Furthermore, the fit between Willingboro's means and ends was considerably looser
than that here. While the Court agreed that the township's interest in promoting integrated
housing was "important," the Linmark Court objected to the means chosen to advance this
goal. Id. at 94. First, it was not persuaded that a signage ban was necessary, absent evidence
that eliminating signs in fact reduced panic selling. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1980) ("[In Linmark,] we observed that there
was no definite connection between the township's goal of integrated housing and its ban on
the use of 'For Sale' signs in front of houses."). Nor was the Court convinced that
Willingboro was actually experiencing a great deal of "white flight" that called for such a
response. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 95-96. The Court also determined that the ban did not leave
available ample alternatives for addressing buyers' and sellers' legitimate interest in
communicating about available real estate; other options (such as newspaper advertisements
and listings with real estate agents) were more costly and less effective in delivering this
information. Id. at 93.
2 Indeed, not everyone is convinced that decisionmaker speech sufficiently "concerns"
illegal activity to warrant stripping it of First Amendment protection. Tung Yin, for example,
accepts Pittsburgh Press's analysis with respect to discriminatory advertisements, but would
distinguish the ADA's prohibitions on disability-related inquiries because, in his view, such
questions do not "automatically deter" certain applicants in the way that sex-segregated job
advertisements do. Yin, supra note 9, at 118-19.
In a few situations, decisionmaker expression may be regulated even where the
threatened discrimination is not illegal in a particularjurisdiction. Because such commercial
speech is not related to unlawful activity, it is entitled to the protection offered by
intermediate scrutiny. Consider, for example, Nomi v. Regents for the Univ. of Minn., 796
F. Supp. 412 (D. Minn. 1992), vacatedas moot, 5 F.3d 332 (1993). That case involved a First
Amendment challenge to a public university's policy forbidding the use of campus facilities
for recruitment by employers who refused to sign assurances that they did not engage in
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made clear that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression" of
"communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.""' 3 Because
decisionmaker inquiries into protected class status and statements of discriminatory
preference may deceive individuals into believing that certain opportunities are not
available to them," 4 that speech may also be banned as misleading.
Even "innocent" inquiries (that is, where the employer has no intention of using
the information elicited in a discriminatory way) may leave an applicant with the
inaccurate impression that the opening will not be available to him. In Pittsburgh
Press, for example, the newspaper argued in part that its advertisements merely
reflected the reality that men and women gravitated to certain job categories and
thus might find sex-designated ads helpful in their search for employment." 5 Even
if this were true, however, listing job openings in sex-segregated columns was likely
to (mis)lead women to conclude that male-designated jobs were closed to them (and
men to believe the same of openings characterized as of "female interest")."6
sexual orientation discrimination. Because the ban on sexual orientation discrimination was
a matter of school policy rather than federal, state, or local law, the parties stipulated that
recruiters' speech in violation of the policy did not concern illegal activity. The district court
then upheld the university's restriction under intermediate scrutiny. The decision was later
vacated as moot after the student plaintiff graduated.
Under Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny, 'the government's interest must be
"substantial," its regulatory means must directly advance that end, and those means must be
narrowly tailored to achieve their objective. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Bd. of Trs. of
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). In Fox, the Court explained that this
standard requires "a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest
served,' that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but.., a means narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired objective." Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citations omitted).
Although applying this standard is far from an exact science, decisionmaker speech
restrictions appear appropriately crafted to withstand this level of scrutiny. Indeed, these laws
may well survive the more rigorous strict scrutiny. See infra notes 192-214 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of strict scrutiny analysis in this context.
This is by no means a unanimous view. Tung Yin, for example, argues that the ADA's
ban on disability-related inquiries would fail Central Hudson's means-ends assessment. See
Yin, supra note 9, at 123-24. In particular, he is unpersuaded that the ban directly advances
the government's admittedly substantial interest in eliminating discrimination, nor does he
believe that the prohibition is sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id at 128-35.
1,3 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563; see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994).
" See supra note 41-49 and accompanying text.
11 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 381
n.7 (1973).
116 See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of44 Liquormart, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 123, 150-52 (asserting that even if the
Pittsburgh Press ads did not explicitly exclude women from applying for male-designated
jobs, they made such applications substantially less likely).
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Similarly, an applicant with a disability confronted by employer questions about her
medical status or use of prescription drugs might well be [mis]led to conclude that
the job is unavailable to those with certain medical conditions.' 7 If the applicant is
wrong in reaching this conclusion, then the query may be unprotected because it is
misleading. If she is right, then the query is unprotected because it facilitates illegal
discrimination.
Moreover, power imbalances between decisionmaker and applicant (or
supplicant, given the importance of the opportunity sometimes at stake) exacerbate
the danger that decisionmaker speech will mislead its recipients. An applicant
confronted with communications of this type is unlikely to question or rebut the
speech without risking loss of the opportunity altogether.
On several occasions the Court has considered the power disparity between
speaker and listener in assessing the effects of the decisionmaker's speech. For
example, the Court appeared to recognize the dangers created by certain
decisionmaker speech in NLRB v Gissel Packing Co."' There it held that the
National Labor Relations Board had not violated the First Amendment in
sanctioning an employer who repeatedly told his employees considering union
affiliation that unionization might cause them to lose theirjobs." 9 Although decided
before the emergence of modem commercial speech doctrine, Gissel emphasized the
"economic dependence of the employees on their employers and the necessary
tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended
implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more
disinterested ear."' 20 The Court held the employer's speech to be regulable because
it was "a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such
without the protection of the First Amendment."''
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n, the Court again made clear that a speaker's
greater power and expertise may distort her listener's ability to assess the
information received.' The Court there applied commercial speech principles to
uphold a ban on attorneys' in-person solicitations, noting that they threatened a
larger danger of coercion and overreaching than other types of advertising by
'11 See, e.g., supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
US 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
"9d. at 619.
120 Id. at 617. The Court also relied on the NLRB's experience "that employees, who are
particularly sensitive to rumors of plant closings, take such hints as coercive threats rather
than honest forecasts." Id at 617-18; see also Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 515
(1991) ("Gissel relied heavily on the inequality of power between employer and employee
to justify the restriction on employer expression.").
12' Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618; see also infra note 140-53 and accompanying text for
additional discussion of threats as unprotected illegal conduct.
122 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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lawyers: "[I]n-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection."' 2
3
The D.C. Circuit grappled with the potential for decisionmaker communications
to mislead when it identified the purposes of the Fair Housing Act to include
dispelling any public misunderstanding about antidiscrimination requirements.
24
In an opinion written by then-Judge Ginsburg, it held that the Act was violated when
ads "created a public impression that segregation in housing is legal, thus facilitating
discrimination by defendants or other property owners."'25 In other words, under
the Act, decisionmakers have a duty not to mislead applicants about their legal
entitlement to compete for opportunities free from discrimination.
26
This duty parallels advertisers' duty, under federal and state consumer
protection statutes, not to mislead or deceive. 27 Indeed, these laws acknowledge the
disparity between seller and consumer in knowledge, and perhaps sophistication, by
prohibiting representations that have a tendency to deceive their listeners regardless
of the speaker's intent. 128 Just as deceptive advertising about a product's cost or
123 Id. at 457; see also Post, supra note 62, at 38 ("The Court has sometimes used the
misleading requirement to identify ... circumstances [where the relationship between
speaker and listener is unequal and dependent] and to deprive them of the constitutional
protection of commercial speech doctrine.").
124 Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc. 899 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
125 Id.
126 Id.
27 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (prohibiting unfair
and deceptive representations in context of consumer transactions); Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374 (1975) (holding that the FTC Act prohibits representations
that have the capacity or tendency to deceive consumers); Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 10
(1984) (holding that the FTC Act prohibits representations that are likely to deceive
consumers); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 13-301(1) (prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade
practices that include any "misleading oral or written statement, visual description, or other
representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or
misleading consumers"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (2000) (prohibiting securities dealers
and brokers from making false or misleading statements to induce securities transactions);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400(d) (West 1977) (prohibiting false or misleading statements made
for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of securities).
2 See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368
(1 Ith Cir. 1988) (determining that FTC Act violation "does not take into account the mental
state of the party accused"); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Algoma Lumber Co.,.291 U.S. 67, 81
(1934) (holding that "innocence of motive" does not relieve seller from duty not to deceive
under the FTC Act, as "there is a kind of fraud ... in clinging to a benefit which is the
product of misrepresentation, however innocently made").
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safety is constitutionally unprotected,'29 so too are decisionmaker communications
that mislead applicants into abandoning further pursuit of job or housing
opportunities. 3 '
According to Robert Post, "A useful doctrine ought to distinguish government
interests that are compatible with relevant constitutional values from those that are
not," and "[a] useful doctrine ought to distinguish [effects on speech] that are
compatible with relevant constitutional values from those that are not."'' I believe
that commercial speech doctrine accomplishes these objectives when applied to
decisionmaker speech restrictions.' In short, it explains when (and why)
decisionmaker communications in this particular context are rightly characterized
as unprotected: when they skew, rather than educate, choices among lawful
activities by facilitating illegal discrimination and deterring applicants from
important opportunities. By parsing communications that contribute to informed
decisionmaking from those that undermine it, modem commercial speech doctrine
provides a valuable sorting function.'33
To agree, however, requires that the reader accept, first, that some expression
is more valuable than others for First Amendment purposes; and, second, that
commercial speech accurately describes a category of such lesser expression.
Because many thoughtful folks reject one or both of these premises, commercial
speech doctrine remains in flux and, from some comers, under attack."
129 The Court has made clear that sellers' misleading representations may be banned
altogether without running afoul of the First Amendment. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563-64 (1980) (citations omitted).
130 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
11 Post, supra note 62, at 43.
132 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
I3'  am considerably less sanguine that the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
formulation adequately protects accurate speech about lawful activities. But that discussion
is beyond the scope of this Article's focus on decisionmaker speech that does not fit that
description.
134 See, e.g., Post, supra note 62, at 2 (asserting that commercial speech doctrine is "a
notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence"). Indeed,
many argue that commercial expression does not warrant any constitutional protection
because it fails to further any First Amendment values. See, e.g., Lillian R. Bevier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Commercial Speech,
Economic Due Process, and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). Others are
equally adamant that commercial speech should receive the fullest constitutional safeguards.
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial'
speech is of 'lower' value than 'noncommercial' speech."); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
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Most of the controversy has focused (rightly, I believe) on whether Central
Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard is sufficiently protective of accurate
commercial speech unrelated to illegal activity.'35 But some of the doctrine's
detractors have also decried its treatment of commercial speech that is misleading
or concerns unlawful conduct. For example, Justice Thomas, among the most
vigorous critics of contemporary commercial speech doctrine, sees no need to afford
such speech less protection in the commercial context:
The State's power to punish speech that solicits or incites crime has
nothing to do with the commercial character of the speech.... The harm
that the State seeks to prevent is the harm caused by the unlawful activity
that is solicited; it is unrelated to the commercial transaction itself. Thus
there is no reason to apply anything other than our usual rule for
evaluating solicitation and incitement simply because the speech in
question happens to be commercial.'36
So, while I believe that commercial speech is the best way to think about these
issues for First Amendment purposes, it is not necessarily the only possible
approach. Accepting, for the moment, critics' suggestion that "general First
Amendment principles" should apply with equal force to commercial speech,'37 the
next Part examines how those principles might apply to these civil rights laws.
IV. OTHER FIRST AMENDMENT APPROACHES TO LIMITATIONS
ON DECISIONMAKER SPEECH
Does the constitutionality of these laws depend entirely on the continuing
vitality of commercial speech doctrine, or might they be justified under other First
Amendment approaches as well? This Part considers three possibilities.
Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla,
Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of
Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1993).
"' See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that the analysis set forth in Central
Hudson and refined in Fox affords insufficient protection for truthful, non-coercive
commercial speech concerning lawful activities."); Aleta Estreicher, Securities Regulation
and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 260 (1990) (urging greater protection of
truthful commercial speech, while accepting ban on advertising when the underlying activity
is unlawful).
136 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 578-79 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
117 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra 116, at 126 ("[l]t is unclear why 'commercial speech' should
continue to be treated as a separate category of speech isolated from general First
Amendment principles") (citation omitted).
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A. Is Decisionmaker Speech Completely Unprotected as Discriminatory
"Conduct" Rather Than Speech?
As discussed above, 38 these decisionmaker communications appear to fall most
easily into the category of commercial speech that is unprotected because it concerns
discriminatory, and thus illegal, activity. But even outside the commercial context,
certain expression related to illegal behavior has long been treated as completely
beyond the First Amendment's protection. Is this decisionmaker speech another
example of the sort of "speech"'' 39 that is really unprotected illegal "conduct"?
A great deal of speech is treated as unprotected conduct for constitutional
purposes. For example, the Court has long drawn a content-based distinction
between speech advocating unlawful behavior and speech threatening or soliciting
illegal action.' While the former receives a relatively high level of First
Amendment protection, 4 the latter is considered "conduct" and is completely
138 See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
"' Speech that takes the form of a question is still speech for First Amendment purposes.
Questions, of course, seek to elicit information, and the First Amendment protects
information gathering. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 1461, 1508 (2000) ("[B]oth the Supreme Court and appellate courts have interpreted
the First Amendment to encompass a right to gather information."); Yin, supra note 9, at
114-15:
The fact that the interviewer is asking a question, as opposed to making a
statement, does not strip the speech of First Amendment protection.... [J]ust
as the question "Will you buy X for $Y?" is functionally equivalent to the
statement "I will sell X for $Y," a disability-related question can be an attempt
to gauge the quality of labor being offered by the applicant.
Moreover, the questions themselves deliver information by sending a message about what
interests are valued by the questioner.
140 See, e.g., Post, supra note 62, at 35.
141 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Court held that government may not
punish speech urging illegal behavior except where that advocacy is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
Some commentators have suggested that Brandenburg's principles should apply with equal
force to commercial speech related to illegal activity - i.e., that government may regulate
such speech only when it is intended and is likely to produce imminent illegal behavior. See,
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 116, at 126. It seems to me, however, that the Brandenburg test
might also be characterized as taking various First Amendment approaches to the problem
of incitement, just as a range of First Amendment principles might apply to decisionmaker
speech. For example, incitement might be so close to illegal activity (like solicitation or
conspiracy) as to constitute conduct. Or Brandenburg might be viewed as the outcome of a
balancing analysis - i.e., while political dissent is generally of great First Amendment
value, the value of speech directed to producing imminent lawless activity is outweighed by
its harms. Or it might be seen as a specific application of strict scrutiny - i.e., it defines
proscribable "incitement" to ensure that the government's response is sufficiently narrowly
tailored to address only the most dangerous speech. I discuss the application of these
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unprotected.'42 Similarly, the use of speech to commit illegal acts like price-fixing,
blackmail or conspiracy does not trigger a First Amendment defense to
prosecution. 4 3 Indeed, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n, 44 the Court listed
"[n]umerous examples.. . of communications that are regulated without offending
the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities,
corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information
among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees.' 45
In a related context, even free speech absolutists have consistently
acknowledged that at least some decisionmaker speech - for example, employers'
quid pro quo requests or demands for sexual favors in exchange for a job benefit -
is completely unprotected as discriminatory, and thus illegal, conduct. 146  By
principles to decisionmaker speech restrictions infra at notes 163-214 and accompanying
text.
142 E.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (holding that a federal statute
criminalizing threats against the President does not violate First Amendment).
' E.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' I Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (upholding
the constitutionality of a court order prohibiting a professional society from adopting an
official position stating or implying that competitive bidding is unethical where such position
would be in violation of the Sherman Act); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 502 (1949) (declaring that "placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave
offense against an important public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state
control," and finding no First Amendment problem with an injunction restraining picketing
that violated Missouri's anti-trade restraint law); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842
(9th Cir. 1982) ("The first amendment does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply
because the actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose."); see also EUGENE VOLOKH,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 205 (2001) ("Some
kinds of speech seem so closely tied to illegal conduct that they are often perceived as being
closer to conduct than [speech] ... ."); Post, supra note 62, at 49 n.224 (listing examples of
content-based restrictions on apparently unprotected expression, such as insubordinate
speech by soldiers and speech persuading others to break their contracts).
14 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
145 Id. at 456 (citations omitted). Especially relevant to decisionmaker speech, Daniel
Farber notes "the intuitive belief that commercial speech is somehow more akin to conduct
than are other forms of speech." Farber, supra note 105, at 389. He argues that speech that
serves a contractual function warrants less protection because it "involves talking about a
transaction - and completing the transaction. The transaction itself can be regulated, just
as the language in a contract can give rise to regulation." Id. at 386-87. Rodney Smolla
similarly explains that "the laws governing the language that must appear on a negotiable
instrument never have been thought to implicate freedom of speech. To regulate the language
is to regulate the transaction . . . ." Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment
Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. &LEE. L. REv. 171, 187 (1990).
146 E.g., Browne, supra note 120, at 513 n.193 (asserting that quid pro quo harassment,
even when communicated by speech, is transactional and thus unprotected); Nadine Strossen,
The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No
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definition, quid pro quo harassment can be performed only by a decisionmaker who
has the power to control the terms and conditions of an individual's employment
and threatens to use this authority in a sexually discriminatory way. 47 Because this
Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 701, 704 ("Even the most diehard free speech absolutist
recognizes that the speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is tantamount to threats or
extortion, expression that has long been punishable without raising substantial free speech
concerns in any context."); Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech and Workplace Harassment,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (1992) (stating that quid pro quo harassment, even if it
involves speech, "would seemingly be as unprotected by the First Amendment as any other
form of threat or extortion").
Many of these advocates distinguish verbal hostile work environment harassment as
constitutionally protected expression. Compare Browne, supra note 120, andVolokh, supra
(both arguing that Title VII prohibitions on hostile work environment harassment run afoul
of First Amendment), with Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RUTGERS L. REv. 461,465 (1995), and Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1990) (both arguing that Title VII's prohibition of unwelcome
verbal conduct that creates a sexually hostile workplace does not violate First Amendment).
That quid pro quo harassment always involves decisionmaker (supervisor, rather than
co-worker) speech makes it considerably easier to characterize as primarily transactional -
and thus more like conduct than speech - than hostile work environment harassment by co-
workers. At least a few courts, however, have found that once unwelcome sexual harassment
by co-workers becomes sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment,
it constitutes illegal conduct, rather than expression, for First Amendment purposes. See
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[P]ictures
and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct
in the form of a hostile work environment. In this respect the speech at issue is
indistinguishable from the speech that comprises a crime, such as threats of violence or
blackmail, of which there can be no doubt of the authority of a state to punish.") (citations
omitted); see also Burns v. City of Detroit, No. 213029, 2002 WL 31475274, at *7 (Mich.
Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2002) (finding the Michigan Civil Rights Act prohibition on hostile work
environment "essentially directed toward discriminatory conduct").
Charles Lawrence emphasizes the conflation of speech and conduct in similar
circumstances:
The words "Women Need Not Apply" in a job announcement, the racially
exclusionary clause in a restrictive covenant, and the racial epithet scrawled on
the locker of the new black employee at a previously all-white job site all
convey a political message. But we treat these messages as "discriminatory
practices" and outlaw them under federal and state civil rights legislation
because they are more than speech. In the context of social inequality, these
verbal and symbolic acts form integral links in historically ingrained systems of
social discrimination. They work to keep traditionally victimized groups in
socially isolated, stigmatized and disadvantaged positions through the promotion
of fear, intolerance, degradation and violence.
Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory
and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 787, 795 (1992).
147 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (discussing
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harassment takes the form of speech that forces its recipients to choose between
submission and adverse job consequences, the speech cannot be separated from the
illegal conduct. Similarly, the decisionmaker communications at issue here are so
closely tied to unlawful discrimination that they may be characterized as more
conduct than speech.
The Supreme Court's dictum in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul"' may lend further
support to a characterization of decisionmaker speech as unprotected discriminatory
"conduct:"
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example,
is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets), a particular
content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept
up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory "fighting words,"
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VlI's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices. 149
Like treason or sexually derogatory fighting words, certain decisionmaker speech
is thus unprotected because it essentially constitutes illegal conduct. 5 '
supervisor's threats as quid pro quo harassment).
148 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
149 Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
50 This understanding is supported by the Court's later characterization of this reference
to Title VII as "an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct." See
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,487 (1992).
In R.A. V. the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibiting the display of symbols that
may cause "anger, resentment or alarm" on the basis of race, religion, or gender. In holding
the law to be an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction on expression, the Court
explained that
a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others,
because of the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech
that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment protection) is in its view
greater there. But a statute may not prohibit only that commercial advertising
that depicts men in a demeaning fashion.
Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted).
The decisionmaker speech restrictions at issue here are distinguishable from the law
invalidated by the Court in R.A. V. for several reasons. First, and most important, the speech
at issue in R.A. V. was not commercial expression, so it did not fall within that category of
less protected speech. Second, prohibitions on disability-related and other inquiries into
protected class status are not viewpoint-based regulations (because they bar all inquiries
regardless of whether innocently or invidiously motivated), and thus do not raise the
concerns presented by the St. Paul ordinance. Third, as described above, R.A. V's dictum
lends support to the argument that discriminatory advertisements and other statements of
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As Frederick Schauer observes, the line between protected "speech" and
unprotected "conduct" is hard to mark clearly: there are no "moderately workable
and well-known doctrinal or theoretical standards to determine the scope of the First
Amendment's coverage."'' Instead, the line seems to be drawn on a largely
intuitive (and, some might argue, maddeningly unprincipled) basis.'52 'I do not
propose a solution in this Article, but simply note that this decisionmaker speech can
plausibly be characterized as more akin to discriminatory conduct than expression,
and thus entitled to no First Amendment protection."3
B. Is Decisionmaker Speech Less Protected as "Low Value" Speech?
If these decisionmaker inquiries and statements are not entirely unprotected as
essentially discriminatory conduct, are they nonetheless regulable as "low value"
speech entitled to less than full First Amendment protection? The Court has
identified a series of "less protected" categories of speech that include fighting
words, "'4 obscenity,' defamation, 5 6 and, as discussed above, commercial speech.
discriminatory decisionmaker preference are unprotected discriminatory conduct. Finally,
as discussed infra at notes 192-214 and accompanying text, even if none of these doctrines
apply, these civil rights laws may survive strict scrutiny.
151 Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARRASSMENT LAW (Catherine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., forthcoming 2000)
(manuscript at 2, available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/wappp/research/schauer.pdf).
152 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 97, at 827:
The trouble with the distinction between speech and conduct is that it has less
determinate content than is sometimes supposed.... It is thus not surprising that
the Supreme Court has never articulated a basis for its distinction; it could not
do so, with the result that any particular course of conduct may be hung almost
randomly on the "speech" peg or the "conduct" peg as one sees fit.
'" While decisions about where to advertise available opportunities may have some
expressive component, they seem even more like conduct as illegally discriminatory
recruitment practices. Consider, for example, an employer's decision to advertise solely in
the Klan's political newsletter. Courts have generally treated such choices as "practices" that
may be evaluated as possibly discriminatory. See, e.g., EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire
Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the possibility of pattern and
practice discrimination based on employers' reliance on word of mouth advertising); EEOC
v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292,298 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We cannot conclude
that as a matter of law it is impossible for an employer to discriminate intentionally against
blacks by relying on word-of-mouth [recruiting]... ."); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d
543 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding word-of-mouth recruiting may create illegally disparate impact
if it unjustifiably results in predominantly white workforce).
114 E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
"s E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 70 (1973).
156 E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.; 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
'17 See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text. For purposes of this discussion, in this
subpart I ignore the fact that commercial speech generally forms a specific category of less
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As explained in RA. V. v. City of St. Paul,' the Court created each category after
a balancing analysis determined that the expression's harm outweighed its relatively
limited ability to further First Amendment purposes:
[O]ur society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are
"of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."' 59
This categorical approach, of course, has both fans and critics. Supporters
suggest that balancing is inescapable given the practical challenges faced by
governments confronted with very real problems." ° Skeptics, on the other hand,
argue that the very exercise of identifying "low value" expression is incompatible
protected speech, and instead apply the Court's balancing analysis to decisionmaker speech
as a separate category.
15 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
119 Id. at 382-83 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). Justice White's concurring
opinion further described this process:
[T]he Court has held that the First Amendment does not apply to [certain
content-based categories] because their expressive content is worthless or of de
minimis value to society. We have not departed from this principle, emphasizing
repeatedly that "within the confines of [these] classification[s], the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake,
that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required."
Id. at 400 (citations omitted); see also Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212,
125 1-52 (1983):
[The Court] has balanced the impact of challenged regulations on first
amendment values against the seriousness of the evil that the state seeks to
mitigate or prevent, the extent to which the regulation advances the state's
interest, and the extent to which the interest might have been furthered by less
intrusive means.
'6 See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1980) ("Some balancing is inescapable. The ultimate question is
always, where has - and should - the balance be struck?"); Kent Greenawalt, Speech and
Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645, 785 ("Anyone who supposes that the protections
of the First Amendment can be reduced to one justification or one all-purpose test of
coverage is either deluded or willing to sacrifice a great deal in the interests of theoretical
neatness and actual or apparent simplicity of administration."); Cass R. Sunstein, Can
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 605 ("[I]t would be difficult
to imagine a sensible system of free expression that did not distinguish among categories of
speech in accordance with their importance to the underlying purposes of the free speech
guarantee.").
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with the First Amendment's plain language,16' and warn of the danger that
definitional lines will be drawn to suppress unpopular or dissenting speech. 62
Again, I do not seek to resolve this debate here (and I note that the Court seems
reluctant to add to the list of "low-value" categories),'63 but instead to explore how
decisionmaker speech might fare under such an approach.
The harms posed by these decisionmaker communications have already been
discussed.'" We now turn to the other side of the scale, examining the free speech
values potentially advanced by the inquiries and statements at issue here - and the
First Amendment costs of restricting them.
A great deal of debate, of course, has sought to identify the core value or values
protected by the First Amendment.'65 Without revisiting that contest here,
decisionmaker speech implicates many of those values most often cited.
For example, prohibiting certain decisionmaker inquiries restrains some
exchange of truthful information, which is generally identified as among the core
First Amendment values."6 Whether an applicant has a disabling medical condition,
161 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
62 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,761 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring):
I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally
to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First
Amendment is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection, and
which is less "valuable" and hence deserving of less protection.
See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 751-52 (1993) (criticizing the Court's distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech, noting that "there seems to be no debate that the
First Amendment bars the majority from suppressing the speech of some simply because
others find it to have little value"); Michael E. Rosman, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENT.
317, 323 (1996) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS,
COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIESOF SPEECH (1995)) ("[U]sing concepts like 'low value' speech
is a dangerous thing. We have a grave tendency to identify modes of communication that
others use as 'low value,' and the modes that we use as 'high value."').
163 See, e.g., Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. at 746 (declining to characterize "indecent" speech
that falls short of obscenity as low-value speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26
(1970) (declining to characterize profanity as low value speech).
16 See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 26-31 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment's primary purpose is to
further self-government); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 593 (1982) ("[Tjhe constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one
true value, which I have labeled 'individual self-realization."'); Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1256 (1983) ("The first amendment is at least in part
designed to further the process of arriving at the truth. When the state tries to prevent the
dissemination of truth, it is time to demand justification.").
'" See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
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is gay or straight, married or single, are generally verifiable facts. Of course, the
civil rights laws at issue render them legally irrelevant, but they remain factually
true nonetheless.
Moreover, precisely because this information is irrelevant for decisionmaking
purposes, allowing inquiries may further the development of independent judgment
skills, which has been identified by some as an additional First Amendment value.167
When permitted to acquire this information - while declining to act on it -
decisionmakers may learn to use their discretion more wisely and fairly. In addition,
eliciting such information might arguably further decisionmakers' tolerance by
increasing their knowledge about their applicants' diversity. 6
Decisionmaker advertisements and other statements of discriminatory
preference may, moreover, include political opinion and expressions of religious
belief, which are almost universally seen as forming the very core of the First
Amendment.'69 The plaintiffs in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission7'
Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1405, 1411
(1987) ("Most theoretical writings have suggested variants of four different values as critical
to speech protections: individual development, democratic government, social stability, and
truth.") (citations omitted); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) ("Over the years, we have come to view freedom
of expression as essential to: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge
and the discovery of truth; (3) participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and
(4) maintenance of the proper balance between stability and change."); Schauer, supra note
151 (manuscript at 8) (stating that the "posited" but "contested" purposes of the First
Amendment include assisting the search for truth, encouraging dissent, checking abuses of
power, facilitating democratic deliberation, and permitting individual self-expression).
.67 See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 135, at 324-26 (arguing that the First Amendment
encourages independent judgment by allowing the exercise of "judgment muscles" that"may
otherwise atrophy from disuse"); Kent Greenawalt, supra note 160, at 673 (identifying
"independence of judgment" as an additional First Amendment value).
161 See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) (arguing that the First
Amendment seeks, inter alia, to instill tolerance among citizens). See supra note 40 for a
discussion of the value of collecting aggregate data on applicants' protected class
characteristics in enhancing equal opportunity efforts.
169 See supra note 166. But note that the "value" of such expression in contributing to
vigorous public discourse may be diminished by the limited opportunities for full and free
discussion of differing views in the workplace and similar hierarchical settings. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 267,289 (1991) ("[A]n image of dialogue among autonomous self-governing citizens
would be patently out of place [in the workplace].").
Because of the power disparities inherent in decisionmaker speech, some might argue
that it should be regulable under the Court's "captive audience doctrine." Indeed, this may
be another way of describing how these communications are less valuable because they do
not contribute to the exchange of ideas most valued by the First Amendment. Under the
captive audience doctrine, "[t]he First Amendment permits the government to prohibit
offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable
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and Hyman v. City of Louisville,7 ' for example, proposed queries and
advertisements that reflected their religiously-based opposition to, respectively,
nonmarital cohabitation and same-sex relationships.' An employer or landlord
might similarly include political viewpoints on the merits of antidiscrimination
laws when communicating with applicants: "The ADA was written by stupid
politicians who don't understand the cost of accommodating folks with certain
disabilities. I sure hope you don't have one." For the same reasons, decisionmaker
statements often include self-expression, an interest also recognized as a
fundamental First Amendment value:' "This is what I believe. This is who I am."
Some decisionmaker speech may also be self-expressive in a social, as opposed
to political or religious, way. Consider queries or comments by an employer
seeking to commiserate about shared medical conditions, thus breaking the ice in a
job interview ("My back is killing me - do you have a bad back too?") or by a
landlord who is genuinely interested in the lives of his tenants ("Do you have a
boyfriend [or girlfriend]? Any thoughts about marriage?").
After determining that decisionmaker speech furthers at least some of the First
Amendment's primary purposes, we next balance these values against the harms it
poses. On balance, these communications appear to inflict damage that outweighs
their benefits.
Concerns that forbidding certain decisionmaker queries interrupts the free
exchange of information, for example, should be weighed against the information's
legal irrelevance. The primary purpose of information flow is to enable individuals
speech." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,487 (1988) (citations omitted) (holding that a ban
on residential picketing did not violate the First Amendment because of the important
government interest in protecting residential privacy). While I agree that the coercive effects
of decisionmaker speech are critical to the First Amendment analysis, I think this danger is
more appropriately addressed when assessing the strength of the government's interest, as
well as when gauging the appropriate scope of its regulation. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin &
Clark L. LeBlanc, DisfavoredSpeech About FavoredRights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing
Public Forum, and the Needfor an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L. REv.
179,207 (200 1) ("Given the (Frisby] Court's strong language in favor of protecting the home
and its emphasis on the limited communicative potential of the speech, it is virtually certain
that the ordinance would have survived strict scrutiny had it been used."). Like the secondary
effects doctrine, see infra note 192, the captive audience concept may be a way to avoid
acknowledging that legislatures and courts are actually balancing the expression's value
against its harms. While this may be inevitable, we should be clear that we are doing it so we
can honestly and fairly debate whether the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs to free
expression.
170 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
'' 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540-41 (W.D. Ky. 2001), vacated, 53 Fed. App, 740 (6th Cir.
2002).
172 See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 166.
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to make choices, to act responsively. Because the antidiscrimination laws bar
discriminatory action, the information sought is valueless because it cannot be used
to support decisionmaker choices.
Indeed, governmental restrictions on the flow of truthful information are fairly
commonplace, resting upon a balancing - explicit or implicit - of the speech's
potential for significant harm against its real, but circumscribed, informational
value. 74  Examples include various confidentiality requirements, 175 as well as
evidentiary prohibitions on the use of privileged communications, hearsay, and other
relevant information deemed more prejudicial than probative." 6
In a related context, moreover, the Court held that truthful information can be
regulated to prevent its discriminatory misuse when it struck down, on equal
protection grounds, Louisiana's law requiring that political candidates be identified
by race on all ballots and nominating papers.'7 Its holding supports the principle
that the exchange of factually accurate information may be checked in certain
limited contexts that invite discriminatory application:
[This case] has nothing whatever to do with the right of a citizen.., to
receive all information concerning a candidate which is necessary to a
proper exercise of his franchise. It has to do only with the right of a
State to require or encourage its voters to discriminate upon the grounds
of race.... [B]y placing a racial label on a candidate at the most crucial
stage in the electoral process - the instant before the vote is cast - the
State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as
to operate against one group because of race and for another."8
The Anderson Court recognized the danger of labeling individual characteristics
in a way that facilitates discriminatory decisionmaking and found that this hazard
outweighed any informational value: "Nor can the attacked provision be deemed
to be reasonably designed to meet legitimate governmental interests in informing the
electorate as to candidates. We see no relevance in the State's pointing up the race
of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office."'' 79 This, of course, is
17 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461,1512 (2000)
("It has long been assumed that sufficiently great government interests allow the legislature
to criminalize the publication of certain special types of accurate information.").
175 See, e.g., Post, supra note 62, at 52 ("Every confidentiality requirement suppresses the
flow of accurate information to citizens because of fear that persons will use or respond to
the information in a manner that might cause harm.").
176 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 105, at 401 (discussing evidentiary rules that limit the
admission of truthful and often relevant information for fear that jurors will misuse it).
177 See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964).
171 Id. at 402.
119 Id. at 403.
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the same danger presented by a decisionmaker's inquiries into an applicant's
disability, sexual orientation, and other protected characteristics.
Moreover, the restrictions' focus on decisionmaker inquiries means that the
exchange of this information is not shut down completely, because opportunity-
seekers remain free to volunteer any personal information themselves, thus
advancing their own interests in self-expression. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found this to be a critical distinction in striking down efforts to bar "situation
wanted" ads by job-seekers that included information about their personal
characteristics.' The court distinguished ads placed by individual job-seekers
describing themselves to prospective employers (including information about their
sex, age, etc.) from the ads placed by employers in the original Pittsburgh Press
case. Because antidiscrimination laws govern only employers' actions, the court
reasoned, ads placed by applicants, rather than decisionmakers, proposed no illegal
transaction and were thus protected commercial speech.'
Similarly, decisionmaker communications that expose bias may well be of value
to applicants in assessing a prospective employer or landlord. Even so, the
expression's dangers appear to outweigh this informational value. Most significant,
permitting such an exchange invites bigoted decisionmakers to undermine
antidiscrimination objectives through "friendly" efforts to "inform" certain
applicants. For example, in United States v. Hunter,' a landlord justified his
advertisement identifying a housing opportunity as a "white home" in this manner:
"It's really a kindness to colored people. There's no use making them ... come here
when I'm not going to rent to them."'83 The Fourth Circuit declined to accept this
defense. 84
8o Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 396 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1979).
18' Id. at 1190. In other words, the laws leave applicants free to volunteer personal
information - including protected class membership - but prohibit decisionmakers from
acting upon such information in a discriminatory way. The Pennsylvania court found that it
was "too speculative" to conclude that job-seekers' ads would cause employers to make
illegal employment decisions. Id. But one can imagine a "situation wanted" ad that might
well encourage at least some employers to discriminate on certain grounds - e.g., "I'm a
young male, completely healthy, unmarried, with no plans for kids, and can thus devote
myself entirely to my job." Such ads are not addressed by the civil rights laws at issue here,
which limit only employer, as opposed to applicant, speech. Whether, as a matter of policy,
such applicant speech should be regulated as inviting or even soliciting discrimination is an
interesting question. As a constitutional matter, applicants' self-expressive interests in
describing themselves are of significant First Amendment value and thus offer one point of
distinction. In any event, the employer's legal obligation not to discriminate in its selection
practices remains unabated; a decisionmaker has the duty not to use this information
(however received) to make discriminatory decisions.
12 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
83 Id. at 215 (omissions in original).
184 Id.
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Concerns about chilling political and other "high-value" speech may also be
mitigated by the restrictions' limited reach. They prohibit certain transaction-related
communications by decisionmakers to persons who may be interested in available
opportunities. Decisionmaker expression that is not "in connection with" or "with
respect to" a covered transaction"5 does not implicate the government's interest in
equal opportunity enforcement, and the limitations do not apply. Decisionmakers
thus remain free to express any political, moral, religious, or other opinion outside
the transactional context (e.g., through letters to the editor, testimony, sermons, etc.).
Because these views may be fully ventilated elsewhere, there appears to be no First
Amendment gain in allowing their expression in this specific context - where their
effect, and sometimes their purpose, is to facilitate discrimination, deter applicants,
and/or invade privacy. Speech in this particular setting is thus of decidedly limited,
if any, value if other avenues for expression remain available that do not pose these
same dangers." 6
C. Can Decisionmaker Speech Restrictions Survive Strict Scrutiny?
If, however, this decisionmaker speech is not characterized as less protected or
unprotected expression, its regulation must survive strict scrutiny.'87 Strict scrutiny
analysis differs from balancing in that it does not weigh the government's interests
against the speech's value.' 8  Instead, regardless of the expression's First
Amendment value, strict scrutiny considers only whether the government's interest
is sufficiently strong ("compelling") and its regulation carefully crafted ("narrowly
185 See, e.g., supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
186 In a related context, some commentators have suggested that prohibitions on harassing
speech are justified after weighing the speech's harm to equal opportunity against its limited
First Amendment value. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality,
and the FirstAmendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 24 ("'Labor speech'
may define a ... category in which content-based regulation is permitted under less exacting
standards than 'strict scrutiny."'); Strossen, supra note 146, at 706-07 (noting that
constraints on employees in a hierarchical workplace may explain "why expression that
might be protected in other contexts should not necessarily be protected at work"). To the
extent that these context-specific arguments are persuasive, they are even stronger with
respect to the inquiries and statements at issue here, which threaten significantly greater
damage precisely because they involve decisionmakers with the power to control access to
important opportunities.
18" The Court applies strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on fully protected speech.
See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,774 (2002); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
18 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2438-39.(1996). For example, the Court has
upheld, under strict scrutiny, restrictions on what some would characterize as speech of the
highest value: campaign and related political speech. See infra notes 205-11 and
accompanying text.
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tailored").'89
Strict scrutiny is a tough standard.'" But while demanding, it is not
impregnable. Although most content-based limitations on expression fail this test,
a few have survived. 9' How would - and should - restrictions on decisionmaker
speech fare if subject to strict scrutiny?'
We begin by considering whether the government's regulatory goals are
compelling. The requisite strength of the government's interest in eliminating
various types of discrimination is clearly established in some cases, but not in
others. While the Supreme Court has made clear that the government's interests in
addressing race and sex discrimination are compelling,'93 it has not specifically
assessed the government's interest in ending other kinds of discrimination.'94 The
189 See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 774-75; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118.
9 But some feel that it is not tough enough. Justice Kennedy, for example, prefers a
standard even more suspicious of content-based restrictions. When confronted with a
governmental content-based speech regulation that is not limited to a category of less
protected speech ("not obscene, not defamatory, not words tantamount to an act otherwise
criminal, not an impairment of some other constitutional right, not an incitement to lawless
action, and not calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the State has the
substantive power to prevent"), he would bypass the application of strict scrutiny and simply
hold the action unconstitutional. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
"i' See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
192 Rather than treating these laws as content-based limitations, some might instead
characterize them as content-neutral regulations of the speech's "secondary effects" and
thus subject to a standard less exacting than strict scrutiny. The Court's "secondary effects"
doctrine emerged in City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), where it upheld
a city's zoning ordinance that singled out adult theaters for different, and less favorable,
treatment than other types of theaters Id.. at 54-55. The majority reasoned that the ordinance
was content-neutral because it was motivated not by the adult films' pictures or ideas, but
instead by their impact on the surrounding neighborhood in terms of increased crime and
declining property values, Id. at 48. While I believe that increased illegal activity (e.g.,
unlawful discrimination) and other harmful effects created or exacerbated by speech may
properly be considered under strict scrutiny when evaluating the strength of a government's
interest and the calibration of its response, I do not agree that the government's interest in
those effects transforms a regulation of speech from content-based to content-neutral.
193 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,623 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
' In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Court identified a compelling
interest in protecting the right of "members of groups that have historically been subjected
to discrimination ... to live in peace where they wish." Id. at 395. To the extent that the
government need only establish that the affected groups "have historically been subjected
to discrimination," most, if not all, ofthese bases will likely meet this standard. This showing
may be easier in some instances, such as disability and sexual orientation, than in others, like
marital status. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Mass. 1994)
(remanding assessment of whether state interest is compelling in eliminating marital status
discrimination, but noting differences in legal rights conferred to married and unmarried
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lower courts that have wrestled with this issue have reached somewhat mixed
results, but the trend seems to be towards characterizing as compelling a government
interest in addressing any arbitrary discrimination.'" This conclusion seems
unassailable in a nation committed to individual self-determination and equal
opportunity.
The government's interest in protecting individual privacy may also be
compelling as an additional rationale underlying prohibitions on certain
decisionmaker inquiries. Again, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
this question." A number of lower courts have grappled with the issue, generally
concluding that an individual's medical information is constitutionally protected
from unwanted disclosure to or by the government.'97 If an individual's right to
couples and observing that "marital status discrimination is not as intense a State concern as
is discrimination based on certain other classifications"). For a more detailed discussion of
the factors to be considered when determining whether a government's antidiscrimination
interest is compelling, see Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law and the
Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89
GEO. L.J. 719, 738 (2001).
9' These cases generally involve free exercise challenges to state antidiscrimination laws'
application to religious entities. Compare Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165
F.3d 692, 717 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no compelling state interest in preventing housing
discrimination on the basis of marital status), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001), and Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10-11
(Minn. 1990) (plurality opinion) (finding no compelling interest in preventing marital status
discrimination), with Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 279-80
& n.8 (Alaska 1994) (finding a compelling state interest in protecting unmarried cohabitants
from housing discrimination), Gay Rights Coalition v, Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 39
(D.C. 1987) (finding a compelling governmental interest in eradicating discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation), and McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 730 (Mich. 1998)
(finding a compelling state interest in preventing housing discrimination based on marital
status).
96 In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court considered a somewhat related issue,
when it noted that constitutional privacy rights may include an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, including medical information. Id at 598-600.
Although it ultimately found that a state law requiring disclosure of drug prescriptions
included adequate privacy safeguards, the Court acknowledged that the statute "creates a
genuine concern that the information will become publicly known and that it will adversely
affect [plaintiffpatients'] reputations. This concern makes some patients reluctant to use, and
some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such drugs even when their use is medically indicated."
Id. at 600.
"' E.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that a government employer's nonconsensual testing of employees for sickle
cell trait, syphilis, and pregnancy violated employee privacy rights, as "[t]he constitutionally
protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly encompasses
medical information and its confidentiality"); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267
(2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constitutional right to privacy limiting government publication of
individual's HIV status: "We agree that the right to confidentiality includes the right to
2003)
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avoid disclosure of her medical status is constitutionally protected, the government's
interest in preserving that privacy seems similarly compelling.'
Assuming that the government's interests are found compelling, a second - and
harder - question remains: Are these limitations on decisionmaker speech
sufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand, strict scrutiny? Several possible
arguments support the conclusion that they are.
First, the reach of these laws is limited to decisionmaker communications about
available opportunities: advertisements or other notices or proposals, along with
communications during preliminary or actual negotiations, such as job interviews
or discussions while showing an apartment or house. Recall, for example, the Fair
Housing Act prohibits discriminatory statements "with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling."'" ECOA regulations similarly limit only inquiries into protected
class status made "in connection with a credit transaction,"2"0 while Title VII
regulations address similar inquiries only "in connection with prospective
employment."' ' These limitations thus do not extend to communications outside
of the transactional context.0
Indeed, these laws fully preserve alternative avenues for decisionmakers to
engage in political, religious, or other expression outside their role as
decisionmakers - through, for example, letters to the editor, sermons, testimony,
or other statements sharing their views on the morality or wisdom of
antidiscrimination laws. In Pittsburgh Press, the Court took pains to distinguish
speech in this particular transactional setting from political speech: "Nothing in our
holding allows government at any level to forbid. Pittsburgh Press to publish and
protection regarding information about the state of one's health. Extension of the right to
confidentiality of personal medical information recognizes that there are few matters that are
quite so personal as the status of one's health.").
198 See Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in
the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225 (2000) (outlining growing concerns about
genetic discrimination in the workplace); Mark. A. Rothstein et al., Protecting Genetic
Privacy by Permitting Employer Access Only to Job-Related Employee Medical Information:
Analysis of a Unique Minnesota Law, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 399 (1998) (discussing growing
federal and state movement towards protecting medical privacy). Whether an individual has
a constitutionally protected privacy right to avoid disclosure of other personal, yet non-
medical, information - such as sexual orientation, age, or marital status - is considerably
less clear.
199 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
20 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (2002).
201 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2002).
202 The Sixth Circuit, for example, upheld a finding of a Fair Housing Act violation when
a husband and wife "expressed an intention to exercise their control [over a trailer rental] in
a discriminatory way." Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706,709 (6th Cir. 1985). The Court noted
the First Amendment problem that would have been created if the discriminatory statements
"had not related to a specific discriminatory and illegal transaction." Id. at 710 n.2.
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distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices
of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment. 20 3
Second, prohibitions on discriminatory statements are designed to address only
those communications that have the purpose or effect of discriminating against or
deterring applicants based on their protected class status. Recall that the test
generally focuses on whether the statements suggest to an ordinary listener or reader
that a particular protected characteristic is "preferred or dispreferred. '2 4
Advertisements and other statements that do not deliver this deterrent message do
not violate these civil rights provisions.
Finally, these restrictions on front-end decisionmaker communications are
narrowly tailored because no less restrictive alternative effectively accomplishes the
government's antidiscrimination interests. Indeed, there is some precedent for
concluding that prophylactic bans of this type are sometimes necessary to achieve
the government's objectives.
In Burson v. Freeman,"5 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a content-
based ban on campaign speech within 100 feet of polling places.2" Applying strict
scrutiny, the plurality first determined that the state's interests in preventing fraud
and voter intimidation were compelling.2"7 Turning to the more difficult question
of whether the ban was sufficiently narrowly tailored, it found that merely
prohibiting intimidation and fraud would address only the most blatant attempts to
impede elections.2"8 Additional preventive efforts - by prohibiting campaign
speech both inside and immediately outside the polling place - were necessary.
The Court upheld a similarly prophylactic rule under strict scrutiny in Buckley
203 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391
(1973). Lower courts have also emphasized this distinction. For example, in United States
v. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit remanded
to ensure that the lower court's finding of a Fair Housing Act violation for a decisionmaker's
discriminatory statements was not based on the defendant's protected announcement that he
would challenge the Act's constitutionality. Id. at 1171. In contrast, as discussed supra note
90, the California Supreme Court's decision in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., failed to preserve
commercial actors' capacity to participate in public debate outside the transactional context
and, in my view, thus runs afoul of fundamental free speech principles.
204 See, e.g., Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1991). For
example, when determining whether certain age-related references in job advertisements
were unlawful, the Fourth Circuit noted that, "[W]e are inclined to think that the
discriminatory effect of an advertisement is determined not by 'trigger words' but rather by
its context." Hodgson v. Approved Pers. Serv., 529 F.2d 760, 765 (4th Cir. 1975). It went
on to conclude, that the term "junior" referred to a position's responsibility, rather than the
preferred youth of the jobholder. Id.
'o1 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
206 Id. at 211.
207 Id. at 199.
208 Id. at 206-07.
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v. Valeo.209 It recognized Congress' compelling interest in addressing the
appearance, and sometimes the reality, that large campaign contributions
compromised their recipients."' Acknowledging that some large contributions exert
no improper influence, the Court nonetheless concluded that a ban on contributions
over a certain size was necessary to achieve the government's anticorruption
goals.2"
Some parallels emerge when we return to proscriptions on certain decisionmaker
inquiries, such as the ADA's ban on employers' disability-related questions.
Although Congress could have restricted less speech, for example, by forbidding
only those questions motivated by discriminatory intent, the ADA's approach
responds to the practical difficulty in screening "innocent" inquiries from those that
will fuel discriminatory decisions. Certain questions might well be benignly posed
by some decisionmakers who would never use the information for decisionmaking
purposes, just as they might be used by others, consciously or unconsciously, to
screen applicants in a discriminatory way."'
Because separating the two in advance seems virtually impossible (just as the
Buckley Court acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing corrupt from benign
campaign contributions of a certain size), an across-the-board ban on certain queries
may well be the only means to accomplish the government's antidiscrimination
interests. Moreover, regardless of the decisionmaker's intentions, these queries
might well deter applicants from continuing to seek the opportunity at stake.
Even more important, decisionmaker speech restrictions also help prevent
209 424 U.S. I (1976); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
657-60 (1990) (upholding a Michigan law prohibiting corporations from using their general
treasury funds for spending on state election campaigns on ground that government has
compelling interest in preventing the reality or appearance of unfair or corrupt corporate
influence and the ban was narrowly tailored because it allowed corporate spending through
segregated funds). In my view, the Court's decisions allowing certain content-based speech
restrictions in the election context shed some light on the application of strict scrutiny in
other contexts as well. But I recognize that elections may raise unique First Amendment
issues. For a thoughtful discussion of this topic, see Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes,
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1803, 1804 (1999)
(suggesting that elections might be subject to "special election-specific First Amendment
principles because of their special role in democracy").
210 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
2' Id. On the other hand, the Buckley Court also held that caps on candidates'
expenditures on their own behalf, total campaign spending, and individuals' direct spending
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 644-54.
2"2 As discussed above, "innocent" queries might include those seeking to break the ice
in an interview (e.g., perhaps commiserating about shared medical conditions: "My back is
killing me - do you have a bad back too?") or by a decisionmaker who is genuinely
interested in the lives of prospective tenants or employees ("Do you have a
boyfriend/girlfriend? Any thoughts about marriage?"). See supra text accompanying notes
173-74.
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discrimination before it happens, which is especially important in light of the
limitations of after-the-fact enforcement described earlier." 3 Recall the Burson
plurality's recognition of the need to prevent speech-induced fraud and voter
intimidation before they occur: "These undetected or less than blatant acts may
nonetheless drive the voter away before remedial action can be taken."2" The
communications at issue here raise very similar concerns - that is, certain
decisionmaker speech may lead applicants to walk away from pursuing
opportunities for which they are legally entitled to complete. Moreover, the
difficulties of after-the-fact enforcement indicate that other approaches that restrict
less speech (such as simply banning discriminatory decisions while declining to
regulate decisionmaker communications) would prevent and redress substantially
less discrimination and thus would be significantly less effective in achieving the
government's equal opportunity objectives.
CONCLUSION
Exploring the free speech issues raised by these civil rights limitations on
decisionmaker expression reminds us yet again of the complexity and uncertainty
of First Amendment doctrine. This discussion highlights, for example, continuing
debates over the value of distinguishing commercial speech from other speech, the
often shadowy line between verbal "conduct" and "speech," the challenges in
separating so-called "low-" and "high-" value speech generally, and the occasional
tension between equality and free speech values.
Rather than attempting to resolve these longstanding quandaries, this Article
seeks to determine whether principled bases exist for defending these laws
consistent with the First Amendment. A few key points deserve emphasis. First,
decisionmaker speech plays a major role in controlling access to employment,
housing, and other important life opportunities. This control may be exercised
(intentionally or otherwise) in a manner that undermines our national commitment
to equality. Second, decisionmaker communications about available opportunities
are of primary value to their recipients, rather than the decisionmakers themselves.
Third, these antidiscrimination provisions preserve other vehicles for
decisionmakers to air their expressive interests outside the transactional context.
By sorting these communications according to their ability to provide accurate
information to inform lawful decisionmaking, the Court's modem commercial
speech doctrine most directly explains why civil rights restrictions on certain
decisionmaker expression do not run afoul of free speech values. Indeed, these
limitations parallel longstanding approaches to consumer fraud and deception.
Commercial speech, however, is not the only means for defending these laws.
213 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
24 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,207 (1992).
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Perhaps the link between these decisionmaker communications and discrimination
is so close that the speech should simply be considered unprotected conduct. Or
perhaps the fit is so tight that the expression's regulation may satisfy strict scrutiny.
In any event, these various approaches offer different ways to describe the same
phenomenon: a specific context where certain speech is so closely tied to
discriminatory action that its regulation is justified.
